Abraham Accords: Hope for Peace or a Fragile Alliance?

 

Introduction 

The Abraham Accords are a set of U.S.-brokered agreements, announced in mid-2020 and ceremonially signed at the White House on 15 September 2020, that created formal diplomatic relations between Israel and a number of Arab states after decades of mostly non-recognition. The headline breakthrough was the Israel–UAE and Israel–Bahrain normalization, presented by the Trump administration as a new regional framework for cooperation in diplomacy, trade, technology and security rather than a solution to the Israeli–Palestinian dispute.

Who signed and who supported them — the first formal signatories in the Abraham Accords were the United Arab Emirates and the Kingdom of Bahrain (September 2020); in the months that followed Morocco and Sudan agreed separate normalization understandings with Israel (Morocco’s was publicly announced in December 2020 and a joint declaration followed; Sudan signed a U.S.-brokered declaration in January 2021 after an October 2020 announcement). The accords were negotiated and promoted by the Trump White House team (notably Jared Kushner and Avi Berkowitz) and were explicitly supported by the Israeli government and by the signatory Gulf and North African regimes as a matter of state policy. Other states (and institutions) offered various degrees of diplomatic praise or cautious welcome, while powerful regional actors such as Saudi Arabia did not formally join but quietly enabled practical measures (for example allowing overflights) that made direct travel and commerce easier.

Why the signatories and supporters did it — the motives were pragmatic and layered: (1) security calculus — many Sunni Arab governments and Israel share concern about Iran’s regional posture, so a public détente with Israel created scope for intelligence, logistics and limited security cooperation; (2) economic opportunity — Gulf states wanted access to Israeli technology, water and food tech, cybersecurity and investment, while Israel saw new markets, investment and hubs for its high-tech and export base; and (3) diplomatic portfolio-building — the U.S. sought a big diplomatic win and the signatory regimes sought prestige and alternative security/diplomatic alignments beyond traditional frameworks. Those motivations help explain why the accords moved forward even though the Palestinian question was largely sidelined.

What the accords have actually produced so far (short–to–medium term) — normalization did lead to rapid, concrete cooperation in certain areas: a surge in business contacts, venture capital and investment partnerships (for example Israeli VC activity and joint UAE-Israel commercial initiatives), new air links and tourism flows, and early energy, water and tech projects. Bilateral goods and services trade between Israel and the UAE jumped rapidly in the first years after 2020 and private investment vehicles and innovation programs were launched. At the same time, progress has been uneven and sensitive to crises: conflict in Gaza and shifts in Israeli domestic politics have cooled some publicly visible business ties, and a number of promised multibillion-dollar projects (and a U.S. “Abraham Fund”) have under-delivered relative to initial expectations. In short: tangible economic and diplomatic ties grew, but they remain fragile and largely dependent on political context.

Security and political ripple effects — strategically the accords re-ordered parts of Middle Eastern alignment: they institutionalized a pragmatic Israeli-Sunni Arab axis on selected issues (intelligence sharing, counter-terrorism and, to an extent, coordinated posture toward Iran), reducing the monopolistic role of the Israeli–Palestinian track as the only pathway to Arab-Israeli accommodation. Yet this realignment carries trade-offs: it has visibly alienated many publics across the Arab world and Palestinian leaders saw the accords as a betrayal, which undercuts the legitimacy of normalization at the popular level and can fuel domestic backlash, protests, and political pressure on governments that normalized. Moreover, because the accords did not resolve Palestinian sovereignty or settlements, they can stabilize certain interstate ties while leaving the core conflict unresolved — a mix that can lower the chance of a negotiated two-state outcome even as interstate cooperation grows.

Global and longer-term outcomes — there are a few plausible, logically connected scenarios. In a constructive expansion scenario, practical economic and technological cooperation deepens, other states (possibly including more Sunni states) incrementally move toward public engagement with Israel, and the region gains projects in energy, climate, logistics and high tech that produce a net economic uplift and diffuse some tensions. In a fragmentation scenario, normalization remains elite-driven, public opposition and episodic Israeli–Palestinian violence repeatedly disrupt ties, and regional rivalries (notably with Iran) continue to spur proxy conflict — leaving a patchy set of relationships that can be reversed in a crisis. The balance between these outcomes depends on political choices in Tel Aviv, the willingness of Arab capitals to absorb domestic dissent, and great-power competition (U.S. diplomatic leadership versus Chinese and Russian influence in the region). There is also a reputational dimension: by decoupling Arab-Israeli normalization from a Palestinian political settlement, the accords change the bargaining leverage of all parties — sometimes empowering moderate, pragmatic deals but also risking long-term instability if the Palestinian issue continues to fester.

Conclusion logically, the Abraham Accords are best understood as a pragmatic, partial re-ordering of Middle Eastern diplomacy: they created new state-level avenues for commerce, technology and limited security cooperation and they reflect shared interests among certain Arab states, Israel and the U.S. at the cost of sidelining Palestinian political claims. That mix produces both opportunity (economic integration, reduced diplomatic isolation for Israel, new investment flows) and risk (public backlash, dented prospects for a negotiated Palestinian settlement, and fragility in the face of regional crises). Whether the accords are remembered as a stabilizing realignment or as a brittle, elite project that failed to solve core grievances will depend on whether participating governments use the new links to create inclusive, durable benefits — and whether they are willing to pair normalization with credible steps that address Palestinian rights and reduce the causes of popular grievance.