There is a moment in every geopolitical dispute when the abstract becomes visceral. For Pakistan's farmers along the Chenab's ancient flood plains, that moment arrived not with a declaration of war or a diplomatic cable, but with the silencing of the river itself. In December 2025, satellite imagery confirmed what irrigation officials had been measuring with horror at the Marala Headworks in Punjab: the Chenab's flow had plummeted to just 870 cusecs, compared to a ten-year minimum norm of 4,000 to 4,400 cusecs. Satellite pictures showed the surface area of India's Baglihar dam had shrunk dramatically, a textbook sign of upstream water retention. For 568,000 farming families who depend on the Chenab's canal network, winter wheat was dying in the ground.
This is not a sudden crisis, nor simply a monsoon anomaly. It is the latest chapter in a decades-long upstream strategy by India to build physical infrastructure that grants it the power to control, time, and withhold water flows from Pakistan's most productive agricultural heartland. At its centre is the Baglihar Hydroelectric Power Project on the Chenab, built in Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir, which Pakistan has long argued is a direct violation of the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty. With India's formal suspension of that treaty in April 2025 following the deadly Pahalgam terror attack, the legal and humanitarian stakes have reached a magnitude not seen since the treaty was signed.
The Baglihar Dam: Architecture of Upstream Control
The Baglihar Hydroelectric Power Project sits in the Ramban district of Jammu and Kashmir, a concrete gravity dam 144.5 metres high and 363 metres long, impounding a reservoir of 475 million cubic metres of the Chenab's flow. India conceived the project in 1992, received approval in 1996, began construction in 1999, and commissioned its first stage in 2009. By 2015 the full 900-megawatt facility was operational. The cost: approximately one billion US dollars. What India built, in engineering terms, was a run-of-river hydroelectric plant. What it built in strategic terms was an upstream tap on the river that carries life to one of the world's most intensively farmed plains.
The numbers speak plainly to the stakes. The Chenab River provides water to 21 canals and irrigates approximately 7 million acres of agricultural land in Punjab alone. The river network feeds some of the most productive wheat, cotton, and rice belts on earth. Pakistan's entire contiguous canal irrigation system — the largest such system on the planet — is built on the assumption that the Indus basin's western rivers, including the Chenab, will flow as they have for millennia.
Pakistan objected to Baglihar's design from the outset, citing six specific technical violations of the Indus Waters Treaty's Annexure D. When bilateral talks failed, Islamabad formally referred the dispute to a neutral expert under the World Bank in 2005. The 2007 determination largely sided with India but required small modifications, including a reduction in freeboard height. The ruling did not satisfy Pakistan's deeper concern: that Baglihar's design — its gated spillways, its pondage capacity, its operational flexibility — gave India the ability to manipulate downstream flows far beyond what the treaty envisioned for a run-of-river scheme. Pakistan argued the dam could cause artificial shortages during the critical kharif sowing season and release devastating volumes at will. Both outcomes, it would turn out, eventually happened.
How the Baglihar Mechanism Works Against Pakistan
During reservoir flushing and filling cycles, India can temporarily withhold Chenab flows, causing sharp drops at Pakistani headworks during the critical August-October sowing window. Conversely, India can release stored water rapidly, sending flood pulses downstream. Neither action requires a formal declaration — both can be presented as routine operational decisions for a hydroelectric facility. Pakistan has no mechanism to independently verify or challenge these operations in real time under the treaty's current framework.
The Kishanganga Dimension: A Parallel Chokehold on the Jhelum
The Baglihar story cannot be told in isolation. Running parallel to it is the dispute over the Kishanganga Hydroelectric Project on the Kishanganga River ,a tributary of the Jhelum — in north Kashmir. India completed the 330-megawatt facility in 2017 and Prime Minister Narendra Modi inaugurated it amid protests from Islamabad. Pakistan raised the alarm at the World Bank, arguing that the dam would disrupt water supplies downstream and that its inauguration without resolution of outstanding disputes constituted a violation of the treaty.
The Kishanganga dispute escalated all the way to international arbitration. Pakistan formally requested a Court of Arbitration in 2016. India boycotted the proceedings, calling the court "illegal" and arguing that a neutral expert process it had separately initiated should take precedence. The Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague ruled in July 2023 that it had jurisdiction to hear the case, regardless of India's objections. India continued to boycott.
A 2013 partial award from an earlier arbitral panel had required India to maintain a minimum downstream environmental flow of nine cubic metres per second from the Kishanganga dam, a ruling India may now effectively disregard under its treaty suspension. One independent analyst noted that even at full capacity, Kishanganga's leverage over Pakistan is partly symbolic given its minimal active storage of just 0.0061 million acre-feet. Yet symbolism has consequences in this crisis: the psychological and economic weight of two simultaneous dam operations on the Chenab and Jhelum has amplified Pakistan's sense of existential vulnerability to upstream manipulation.
The Indus Waters Treaty: What It Says and Why India's Suspension Is Contested
The Indus Waters Treaty, signed on September 19, 1960, brokered by the World Bank with signatures from Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and President Ayub Khan, is one of the most durable bilateral water agreements in modern history. It has survived four India-Pakistan wars, the 1971 partition of East Pakistan, the Kargil conflict, and decades of near-permanent diplomatic hostility. Its core architecture divides the Indus system's six rivers: the eastern rivers — Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej — are allocated to India; the western rivers, Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab, are allocated to Pakistan, with India permitted strictly limited uses for irrigation, hydropower, and navigation.
Article III of the treaty guarantees Pakistan's exclusive rights over the western rivers. Article IV prohibits interference with natural flows. Annexures D and E establish engineering and operational limits on Indian hydropower projects. Article IX provides dispute resolution via the Permanent Indus Commission, a neutral expert, and ultimately a Court of Arbitration. On April 23, 2025, India announced it was placing this entire framework "in abeyance" following the killing of 26 tourists in the Pahalgam terror attack in Kashmir, which New Delhi attributed to Pakistan-backed militant groups.
International legal experts have been unanimous that the treaty contains no provision for unilateral suspension. The Permanent Court of Arbitration ruled explicitly in June 2025 that India's abeyance declaration does not limit the court's jurisdiction and that the treaty does not permit either party to unilaterally suspend their obligations. India rejected this ruling as "illegal." The court issued further rulings in August 2025 and most recently in May 2026, all of which India has categorically rejected. As of June 2026, the treaty remains in abeyance according to New Delhi.
The Legal Battlefield: Courts, Arbitration, and India's Silence at the UN
The legal response to India's actions has unfolded across multiple international forums simultaneously, creating an unprecedented convergence of scrutiny. Pakistan formally requested the constitution of a Court of Arbitration at the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague in 2016, which, after years of procedural battles, issued its landmark Award on Issues of General Interpretation on August 8, 2025. The ruling sided with Pakistan on virtually every major substantive issue, finding that India's design and operation of run-of-river hydroelectric projects gave it "greater control over the waters of the Western Rivers than was envisaged or permitted by the Treaty." The court directed India to modify the Kishanganga and Ratle projects to meet Annexure D requirements and to provide comprehensive technical operational data including daily inflows, outflows and storage logs. India categorically rejected the award and all subsequent decisions, maintaining that the court itself was "illegally constituted."
In parallel, Pakistan took the matter to the United Nations Security Council in April 2026, warning that India's continued suspension carries "grave peace and security, and humanitarian consequences" for South Asia. Pakistan's Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar wrote formally to the Security Council president, noting that over 61 percent of women's employment in Pakistan is tied to agriculture and that the treaty's abeyance posed an existential economic threat. Both China and the United States, despite their competing strategic interests, were described as more receptive to Pakistan's position than India might have anticipated.
The most significant international legal development came through the office of UN Special Rapporteurs. On October 16, 2025, UN Special Rapporteurs issued a detailed report expressing specific concerns about India's behaviour toward the treaty and requested a formal response from New Delhi by December 16, 2025. India maintained complete silence. More than 100 days after the deadline, as of April 2026, India had not responded. International legal experts characterised this pattern as evidence of deliberate non-participation in accountability processes — a posture they warned could damage India's standing in multilateral treaty-based institutions.
A separate UN report cited in academic analyses from the Australian Institute of International Affairs noted starkly that India's actions risked setting a global precedent: a 2025 UN Water report observed that 60 percent of transboundary water agreements globally are currently under strain. The fear is that India's upstream weaponisation of water may embolden China, which controls approximately 30 percent of Asia's river flows, to take similar measures against downstream neighbours.
The Timeline of Escalation: From Dams to Water Weaponisation
India informs Pakistan of the Baglihar dam project. Pakistan objects to design parameters. India proceeds with construction in 1999 despite Pakistan's formal objections under IWT Article IX.
Pakistan refers Baglihar design dispute to a World Bank-appointed neutral expert. The 2007 determination requires minor modifications but largely clears India to proceed, leaving deeper structural concerns unresolved.
During initial reservoir filling in October 2008, Chenab flows at Pakistani headworks are reported to have halved to approximately 13,000 cusecs, directly coinciding with the critical kharif sowing season. Stage 2 of Baglihar commissioned in 2015.
Pakistan requests Court of Arbitration at PCA over Kishanganga and Ratle projects. India inaugurates Kishanganga dam (330 MW). India boycotts arbitration proceedings.
PCA rules it has jurisdiction. India begins seeking bilateral modification of the IWT; Pakistan refuses. India calls off all meetings of the Permanent Indus Commission. India completes Shahpurkandi Dam on the Ravi in 2024, further consolidating upstream control.
Following the Pahalgam attack (26 killed), India suspends the IWT. India conducts reservoir flushing at Salal and Baglihar dams without notifying Pakistan — previously prohibited under the treaty. Reports emerge of a 90% cut in Chenab water flow to Pakistan through Baglihar. Kharif crop sowing in Pakistan's Punjab is directly threatened.
PCA issues supplemental award confirming India cannot unilaterally suspend the treaty. India rejects it. On August 8, PCA issues comprehensive award siding with Pakistan on water flow rights. India rejects this too. Pakistani Army Chief threatens to destroy Indian dams with missiles.
Catastrophic floods in Pakistani Punjab as monsoon rains combine with upstream dam water releases. GEOGLAM satellite data confirms 220,000 hectares of rice flooded. Pakistan Business Forum estimates crop losses of 60% rice, 30% sugarcane, 35% cotton.
Chenab flow at Marala drops to 870 cusecs — far below the 10-year minimum of 4,000-4,400 cusecs, as satellite imagery shows significant water retention at Baglihar. UN deadline for India's response to Special Rapporteur report passes in silence. Pakistan formally raises IWT dispute at UNSC in April 2026.
The Agricultural Catastrophe: Data From the Fields
Agriculture is not merely an economic sector in Pakistan — it is the civilisational spine of the country. It accounts for 24 percent of Pakistan's GDP and 37.4 percent of total employment in 2024. Over 64 percent of the population depends on agriculture either directly or through associated industries. The Chenab River, flowing through the heart of Pakistan's Punjab province, is the engine of this entire system. Its 21 downstream canals carry water to headworks at Marala, Khanki, Qadirabad, and Trimmu, distributing irrigation across 7 million acres of farmland.
Punjab alone, according to Pakistan's latest Agriculture Census published in August 2025, provides between 51 and 68 percent of the country's wheat, rice, maize, cotton and sugarcane, as well as 85 percent of all fodder crops. When the Chenab runs dry — or when it floods without warning — Punjab's farmers and by extension Pakistan's food security system are in crisis simultaneously. Both extremes were inflicted in 2025.
The 2024-25 cropping year was already devastating before the dam manipulations intensified. Pakistan's five major crops — wheat, cotton, rice, sugarcane, and maize, collectively declined by 13.5 percent. Cotton bore the heaviest blow, plummeting 30.7 percent. Maize fell 14.7 percent. Wheat dropped 8.9 percent. The Pakistan Meteorological Department recorded a 25 percent rainfall deficit in rain-fed regions during critical sowing months, and the Pakistan Agricultural Research Council reported fertiliser shortages during key planting periods. Water scarcity from the upstream Chenab restrictions compounded every one of these blows.
| Crop | Production Change 2024-25 | Primary Impact Factor |
|---|---|---|
| Cotton | ▼ 30.7% | Water scarcity + policy failures |
| Maize | ▼ 14.7% | Erratic monsoon + irrigation deficit |
| Wheat | ▼ 8.9% | 25% rainfall deficit, sowing disruption |
| Sugarcane | ▼ 3.9% | Flood damage + reduced Chenab flow |
| Rice | ▼ 1.4% (then flood-devastated in Aug-Sep 2025) | Upstream water release, 60% loss by Sep 2025 |
Then came the monsoon season floods of August-September 2025. GEOGLAM Crop Monitor satellite analysis confirmed that an estimated 220,000 hectares of rice were flooded between August 1 and September 16, 2025, with significant reductions in rice cultivation area detected in Sheikhupura and Faisalabad districts. Pakistan Business Forum's preliminary assessment estimated crop losses of 60 percent of rice, 30 percent of sugarcane, and 35 percent of cotton for the 2025 kharif season. Provincial authorities reported approximately 2.5 million acres of farmland, roughly one million hectares,submerged. Around 568,000 farming families faced the destruction of their livelihoods in a single season.
The dual nature of the water weapon — withholding in winter to kill the rabi wheat season, releasing in summer to drown the kharif crops, has been described by Dr. Zilakat Malik as a calculated pattern of harm. "The recent extraordinary reduction of water flow in the Chenab River," he noted in February 2026, "could threaten livestock and agriculture sectors, especially in Azad Kashmir and Punjab provinces. It will likely affect about 40 percent of agriculture crops including wheat and rice, threatening livelihoods across Pakistan."
What the Experts Say: Is This a Treaty Violation?
The question of whether India's hydro-strategy on the Chenab constitutes a violation of the Indus Waters Treaty has generated a significant volume of expert opinion, legal analysis, and institutional rulings, virtually all of which point in the same direction.
The Court of Arbitration at the PCA, in its January 2026 procedural order during the merits phase, directed India to submit comprehensive technical and operational data relating to both the Kishanganga and Ratle/Baglihar hydropower projects, including daily inflows, outflows, storage levels, and operational logs. The tribunal's language was explicit: compliance under the treaty is "determined by substantive effect on downstream flows, not by labels or formal designations." India refused to submit the data.
Pakistan's Commission on Indus Waters, in a report submitted to the federal government, detailed a series of specific violations including the construction of the Kishanganga project and four Chenab hydroelectric plants, all without proper consultation or resolution of Pakistan's design concerns as required by the treaty. The American Society of International Law documented the treaty's dispute resolution history, noting that Pakistan's "central concern" was that India could manipulate and release virtually all waters in the Baglihar reservoir or withhold large volumes, thereby flooding or desiccating Pakistan at will.
Legal scholars examining the IWT's framework under international law have been equally categorical. Pakistan's National Security Committee in April 2025 declared that "persistent water weaponisation by India" constitutes a material breach of the treaty. The committee specifically cited Article III's guarantee of Pakistan's exclusive rights over western rivers and Article IV's prohibition on interference with natural flows as the primary violated provisions. The IWT, the committee affirmed, is binding under international law, a position consistently upheld by all international legal forums that have examined it.
India's counter-argument rests on two pillars. First, that Pakistan's alleged support for cross-border terrorism constitutes a material breach of the bilateral relationship that justifies treaty abeyance under customary international law. Second, that climate change, demographic pressures, and technological advances have rendered the 1960 treaty outdated, warranting renegotiation. Both arguments have been rejected by the PCA and by most international legal observers. As the Court of Arbitration noted in June 2025, India's references to "material breach" and alleged cross-border terrorism are "legally weak grounds for suspension" because Pakistan was not shown to have violated any specific treaty clause , and the treaty itself contains no terrorism or security exception.
International Reactions: Who Stands Where
Rhetorically aligned with Pakistan, citing the principle that "water belongs to everyone." Beijing has deepened strategic water-cooperation discussions with Islamabad through CPEC frameworks and is expected to back Pakistan at the UNSC. India argues China's position is hollow given its own upstream dam projects on the Brahmaputra.
Officially neutral but notably engaged with Pakistan. President Trump's admiration for Pakistan's Army Chief Asim Munir and Washington's interest in regional stability has given Pakistan more leverage than expected. The US has traditionally balanced ties with both nations but has not backed India's treaty suspension.
Issued a detailed formal report in October 2025 expressing specific concerns about India's treaty behaviour. Requested India's response by December 2025. India did not reply. UN experts subsequently rebuked India, noting that bypassing agreed dispute-resolution mechanisms risked "serious human rights consequences."
Ruled consistently for Pakistan in June 2025, August 2025, and May 2026. Found India's abeyance declaration illegal, reaffirmed its jurisdiction, awarded Pakistan's interpretation of water flow rights, and ordered India to provide operational data. India rejected all rulings as from an "illegally constituted" court.
Frames the treaty suspension as a legitimate security response to Pakistan-backed terrorism. Argues the 65-year-old treaty requires modernisation for climate change and demographic realities. Maintains that all Indian hydropower projects comply with treaty provisions and characterises international arbitration as Pakistan misusing dispute mechanisms.
As the treaty's original broker and guarantor, the World Bank has reiterated that the IWT is "a profoundly important international agreement." It has called for amicable resolution of disputes within the treaty's framework. Pakistan is actively seeking World Bank intervention to halt India's unilateral suspension.
The Humanitarian Dimension and International Humanitarian Law
The question of whether the deliberate manipulation of water flows against a civilian agricultural population triggers protections under international humanitarian law has been raised by several legal scholars. The Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols , particularly Additional Protocol I, Article 54, prohibit the deliberate destruction or withholding of objects indispensable to civilian survival, including food and water infrastructure, as a method of warfare in an armed conflict. While India and Pakistan are not formally in an active armed conflict under the treaty's framework, the period from May to October 2025 saw active military exchanges across the Line of Control, missile strikes, and near-war conditions, raising serious questions about the applicable legal framework.
The UN Development Programme had already projected in 2020 that some 207 million people in Pakistan would face "absolute water scarcity" with less than 500 cubic metres available per person per year by 2025, a threshold defined as acute water stress. When Chenab flows at Marala fall to 870 cusecs against a normal minimum of 4,400, this is not an abstraction. It is a measurable, documented reduction in the water reaching canals that irrigate crops consumed by over 200 million people. The UN Special Rapporteurs specifically cited the risk of "serious human rights consequences" stemming from India's water-related actions — a characterisation that stops just short of invoking humanitarian law but clearly places these actions in the frame of human rights obligations under international law.
Statistical Summary of Damage to Pakistan (2025-2026): Agriculture GDP share threatened: 24% of national GDP. Employment affected: 37.4% of workforce. Chenab canal system at risk: 21 canals, 7 million irrigated acres. Crop losses (kharif 2025): 60% rice, 35% cotton, 30% sugarcane. Total rice area flooded Aug-Sep 2025: 220,000 hectares. Farmland submerged: 2.5 million acres (Punjab floods). Chenab flow reduction December 2025: from 4,400 to 870 cusecs (80% below minimum norm). Farming families directly affected: 568,000 (Chenab basin alone). Women's employment tied to agriculture: over 61%.
India's Four New Chenab Projects: The Infrastructure Locked In for 2027-28
Perhaps the most chilling long-term dimension of this crisis is what has already been built and what is coming. India has made steady progress on four ongoing hydroelectric power projects in Jammu and Kashmir, Pakal Dul (1,000 MW), Kiru (624 MW), Kwar (540 MW), and Ratle (850 MW), all on the Chenab River and its tributaries. These projects are expected to be commissioned between 2027 and 2028. When they come online, India will have an infrastructure capacity on the Chenab not seen since the river first entered disputed territory. The cumulative storage, pondage, and flow-timing capabilities of these projects will dwarf what was available at Baglihar alone.
Simultaneously, India completed the Shahpurkandi Dam on the Ravi in 2024 and is advancing the Ujh Dam on a Ravi tributary, both designed to ensure India maximises its full allocation of the eastern rivers. This represents a policy shift explicitly noted by analysts: for decades, India had underutilised its share under the IWT, allowing significant volumes from the eastern rivers to flow into Pakistan unused. Under Prime Minister Modi's government, this approach has changed decisively. Every drop legally allocated to India is now being captured, stored, and put to use. Pakistan is discovering, in the hardest possible way, that even strict treaty compliance, when it was still in effect, had long offered it more water than the letter of the law required.
Evaluation: The Evidence and What It Means
The evidence assembled in this investigation points to a conclusion that is as uncomfortable as it is unavoidable. India has pursued a systematic, decades-long infrastructure strategy on the Chenab and Jhelum rivers that has progressively increased its capacity to regulate, withhold, and release the water flows that sustain Pakistan's agricultural economy. The Baglihar dam is the centrepiece of this strategy. The Kishanganga dam is its companion. The four new Chenab projects in pipeline are its future.
Whether any specific action at Baglihar constitutes a technical violation of the Indus Waters Treaty in its pre-suspension form remains a matter of ongoing legal adjudication. The Permanent Court of Arbitration has ruled that India's designs and operations give it "greater control than permitted" — and India has rejected that ruling. But the practical reality is undeniable: Pakistan's agricultural heartland has experienced extraordinary, documented reductions in Chenab flow that directly correlate with Indian dam operations, and the human cost has been staggering across two consecutive cropping years.
India's unilateral suspension of the treaty in April 2025 removed even the flimsy remaining pretence of legal compliance. The international legal community — the PCA at The Hague, the UN Special Rapporteurs, international water law scholars — has spoken with unusual unanimity: the suspension is illegal, the treaty is binding, and Pakistan's downstream water rights are being violated. India's refusal to engage with any of these mechanisms, its silence to UN deadlines, and its categorical rejection of every adverse legal ruling constitute a pattern of behaviour that erodes the very foundations of international treaty law.
The deeper danger, flagged by the UN's own water security analysts, is contagion: if a nuclear-armed democracy can suspend a World Bank-brokered treaty in the name of counterterrorism, every upstream nation with dam infrastructure and a security grievance has been handed a template. The Nile, the Mekong, the Brahmaputra — every shared river system on earth is watching. The Chenab is not just Pakistan's problem. It is the world's warning.
Sources & References
- Outlook Business, "India Chokes Water Flow at Baglihar Dam, Slashes Supply to Pakistan by 90%," May 5, 2025. outlookbusiness.com
- Profit by Pakistan Today, "India reduces water flow to Pakistan through Baglihar, Kishanganga dams," May 5, 2025. profit.pakistantoday.com.pk
- The Nation (Pakistan), "IWT violations by India exposes millions of people to starvation: Experts," February 16, 2026. nation.com.pk
- PCA Award on Issues of General Interpretation of the Indus Waters Treaty, August 8, 2025. jusmundi.com
- Courting the Law (Pakistan), "Indus Waters Treaty Case: Ruling Upholds Pakistan's Water Rights," September 3, 2025. courtingthelaw.com
- Britannica, "Indus Waters Treaty: History, Summary, Disputes," updated May 2026. britannica.com
- Express Tribune, "Indus Waters Treaty: A Critical Analysis at the Crossroads," February 8, 2026. tribune.com.pk
- Eurasia Review, "India Remains Silent 100 Days After UN Indus Waters Treaty Deadline," April 3, 2026. eurasiareview.com
- GEOGLAM Crop Monitor Special Report, Flooding along the Chenab River in Punjab, September 2025. cropmonitor.org
- Dialogue Earth / PreventionWeb, "Climate disasters deepen food insecurity in the Punjab region," December 2025. dialogue.earth
- The Friday Times, "A Perfect Storm: The Collapse of Pakistan's Crop Production," June 10, 2025. thefridaytimes.com
- Scroll.in, "Pakistan takes Indus Waters Treaty dispute to UN Security Council," May 2026. scroll.in
- Dawn, "In letter to UNSC president, Dar draws attention to 'grave' consequences of IWT suspension," April 2026. dawn.com
- Australian Institute of International Affairs, "India's Bold Move: Abeyance of Indus Waters Treaty Amid Rising Terrorism," May 2025. internationalaffairs.org.au
- The Conversation, "China's insertion into India-Pakistan waters dispute adds a further ripple in South Asia," October 2025. theconversation.com
- ASIL Insights (American Society of International Law), "The Indus Waters Treaty — Recurring Conflicts, Non-Participation and Parallel Proceedings," April 2025. asil.org
- About Civil Engineering, "Impact of Indian Dams in Kashmir on Pakistani Rivers." aboutcivil.org
- UNDP Pakistan Water Scarcity Report, 2020 projections cited in World Socialist Web Site analysis, May 2025. wsws.org
- SCC Online / Supreme Court of India legal commentary, "Indus Waters Treaty: A Legal Perspective," October 3, 2025. scconline.com
- ISAS (National University of Singapore), "India-Pakistan Water Dispute: Navigating an Uncertain Future," August 19, 2025. isas.nus.edu.sg
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