The Democratic Republic of Congo is facing the fastest growing Ebola outbreak in its history, with more than 5,000 confirmed cases and more than 2,500 deaths. The epidemic is spreading through conflict affected areas where population movement, mistrust, weak surveillance and shortages of resources are making containment extraordinarily difficult. With only a fraction of infections believed to be detected, the question is becoming increasingly urgent: can Congo and its international partners stop Ebola before a regional health emergency becomes an even larger global threat?
Updated: August 21, 2026
Table of Contents
- Why Congo's Ebola Outbreak Has Become a Global Emergency
- Facts at a Glance
- The Numbers Behind the Crisis
- How the 2026 Outbreak Began
- What Is Bundibugyo Virus?
- Why the Vaccine Question Is So Complicated
- How Ebola Is Spreading
- Why Contact Tracing Is Failing
- The Role of War and Displacement
- Health Workers on the Front Line
- Misinformation and Public Distrust
- Congo's Health System Under Pressure
- The International Response
- The Funding Crisis
- Could Ebola Spread Across Africa?
- Could It Become a Global Pandemic?
- The Economic Cost
- Why Pakistan and South Asia Should Pay Attention
- Lessons From COVID 19
- Three Possible Futures
- Key Takeaways
- Conclusion
- Frequently Asked Questions
Why Congo's Ebola Outbreak Has Become a Global Emergency
Ebola outbreaks are rarely ordinary public health emergencies. They are crises in which medicine, logistics, politics, security, economics and public trust collide. The current epidemic in the Democratic Republic of Congo illustrates that reality with unusual force. What began as an outbreak officially declared on May 15, 2026, has now become the largest Ebola epidemic ever recorded inside the country.
By August 21, the confirmed case count had reached 5,290 and deaths had risen to 2,516. Those figures alone would make the outbreak deeply serious. But they do not capture the most worrying element of the crisis. Africa CDC officials say only around 30% to 40% of actual infections may be detected, meaning the known numbers could represent only part of the epidemic.
That possibility changes the entire picture. An outbreak that appears to contain 5,290 confirmed cases may in reality involve a much larger number of infections occurring outside the surveillance system. The problem is particularly severe because less than 10% of new cases are currently being identified through known contacts, whereas a successful Ebola response generally requires the overwhelming majority of infections to be connected to established transmission chains.
This is why the Congo outbreak is attracting international attention. It is not simply a question of how many people have died. It is a question of whether health authorities can regain visibility over the epidemic.
The challenge also fits into a much larger global health problem. WorldAtNet examined the structural side of that problem in its investigation The Unequal Cure: How Healthcare Inequality Is Killing Millions Who Needn't Die . The Congo crisis demonstrates the same principle from a different direction: having medical knowledge is not enough if the health system cannot deliver that knowledge to the people who need it.
Facts at a Glance
| Indicator | Latest Available Figure | Significance |
|---|---|---|
| Confirmed cases | 5,290 | Largest Ebola outbreak recorded in the DRC. |
| Deaths | 2,516 | Demonstrates the exceptional severity of the outbreak. |
| Virus | Bundibugyo virus | A distinct Ebola virus species. |
| Detection estimate | 30% to 40% | Africa CDC estimate of the proportion of infections currently detected. |
| Cases linked to known contacts | Less than 10% | Indicates major gaps in contact tracing. |
| Health workers infected | 160 | Frontline workers face significant occupational risk. |
| Health worker deaths | 43 | Further weakens response capacity. |
| Vaccine allocation | 70,000 doses | Includes doses for research and frontline workers. |
Data reflects reporting available August 21, 2026 from WHO, Africa CDC and international reporting.
The Numbers Behind the Crisis
The speed of the epidemic is perhaps the most disturbing feature of the current situation. The outbreak has already surpassed the previous largest Ebola epidemic in Congo, which occurred from 2018 to 2020. International reporting now describes the current epidemic as the fastest growing Ebola outbreak recorded.
The comparison with the West African epidemic of 2014 to 2016 is even more revealing. That crisis ultimately produced more than 28,000 reported cases and more than 11,000 deaths across Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone. The Congo epidemic has not reached that cumulative total, but the rate of growth during its early weeks has been substantially faster.
Associated Press reporting based on Africa CDC data says that by the thirteenth week the current outbreak had recorded roughly ten times as many cases and seven times as many deaths as the West African outbreak had recorded at the comparable stage.
That does not mean Congo will inevitably exceed the West African death toll. Outbreak trajectories can change rapidly when surveillance improves, treatment becomes more accessible and transmission chains are broken.
But it does mean the present response cannot afford complacency.
| Measure | Current Congo Outbreak | Historical Context |
|---|---|---|
| Confirmed cases | 5,290 | Already the largest total in DRC history |
| Deaths | 2,516 | Higher than previous DRC record |
| Detection estimate | 30% to 40% | Suggests substantial undercounting |
| Known contact linkage | Below 10% | Far below the level associated with effective control |
| 2014 to 2016 West Africa outbreak | More than 28,000 cases | More than 11,000 deaths |
The statistics also illustrate why disease surveillance matters as much as treatment. If health authorities cannot identify where infections originate, they cannot reliably predict where the next cluster will appear.
How the 2026 Outbreak Began
The outbreak was officially declared on May 15 after the virus was identified in Ituri Province. But the formal declaration should not be mistaken for the beginning of transmission. Evidence suggests the virus had already been circulating for some time before authorities recognised the scale of the problem.
That delay is critical in infectious disease control. A virus can move through several generations of transmission before the first cluster becomes obvious. By the time hospitals begin seeing unusual numbers of severely ill patients, dozens or even hundreds of people may already have been exposed.
The current epidemic has subsequently expanded across six provinces and dozens of health zones. Population mobility has complicated the response, particularly in areas affected by conflict and displacement.
This is one reason the epidemic is not behaving like a contained hospital outbreak. It has become a community transmission problem.
What Is Bundibugyo Virus?
Bundibugyo virus belongs to the Ebola virus family but is distinct from Zaire ebolavirus, the species responsible for most of the major Ebola outbreaks that have dominated international headlines.
That distinction is medically important because Ebola is not a single uniform virus. Different species can have different epidemiological characteristics, and vaccines or treatments developed for one species cannot automatically be assumed to work against another.
Bundibugyo virus was first identified during an outbreak in Uganda in 2007. Previous outbreaks were comparatively limited. The scale of the current epidemic therefore represents a major departure from the historical experience with this virus.
The absence of a licensed vaccine or treatment specifically approved for Bundibugyo virus has complicated the response.
Yet the situation is evolving. Researchers are now testing whether existing Ebola tools may provide some degree of protection while developing and evaluating more specific countermeasures.
Why the Vaccine Question Is So Complicated
One of the biggest developments this week is the planned allocation of 70,000 doses of the Ervebo Ebola vaccine to Congo. The announcement is important, but it needs to be understood correctly.
Ervebo is licensed against Zaire ebolavirus. It is not licensed specifically against Bundibugyo virus. Early laboratory and animal evidence suggests it may provide some protection, but that remains an area of investigation.
Of the 70,000 doses being allocated, 20,000 are intended for a Phase 3 clinical trial examining the vaccine's effect against Bundibugyo virus, while 50,000 are intended for frontline and health workers under current recommendations.
This is a remarkable example of science being conducted during an emergency. Instead of waiting years for a perfect vaccine to be developed, researchers are trying to determine whether an existing tool can provide useful protection while maintaining appropriate scientific safeguards.
The vaccine issue also illustrates why research preparedness matters before an epidemic begins. When a rare virus suddenly becomes widespread, scientists need candidate vaccines, manufacturing capacity and trial protocols ready to activate.
The broader lesson is similar to the one WorldAtNet explored in its recent article The Fake Science Epidemic: How an AI Tool Uncovered 250,000 Suspect Cancer Papers . Scientific progress depends not only on producing new knowledge but also on verifying that knowledge properly. In a crisis, the temptation to move faster must never eliminate the need for evidence.
INFOGRAPHIC 1: WHY CONGO'S EBOLA OUTBREAK IS SO DIFFICULT TO CONTROL
The outbreak is expanding faster than earlier major Ebola epidemics at comparable stages.
Only about 30% to 40% of infections may currently be detected.
Less than 10% of cases are currently linked to known contacts.
Population displacement and insecurity obstruct surveillance.
These problems reinforce one another, creating a race between transmission and response capacity.
How Ebola Is Spreading
Ebola is primarily transmitted through direct contact with the blood or bodily fluids of an infected person and through contaminated materials. Transmission risk becomes particularly significant when patients are severely ill and during unsafe burial practices.
This makes Ebola fundamentally different from highly contagious respiratory diseases that can spread through ordinary everyday proximity.
But the fact that Ebola does not normally spread like measles or influenza does not make it easy to contain.
The virus can spread efficiently when people care for sick relatives at home, when patients move between communities, when health workers lack protective equipment or when families are reluctant to report suspected infections.
This is why Ebola control depends heavily on finding cases quickly and understanding who may have been exposed.
The challenge becomes much greater when people move because of conflict.
Why Contact Tracing Is Failing
Contact tracing is one of the most powerful tools available to Ebola responders. Once a patient is diagnosed, health teams attempt to identify everyone who may have been exposed. Those people can then be monitored for symptoms and rapidly isolated if necessary.
In a well controlled outbreak, most new infections can be connected to known transmission chains.
The current Congo figures suggest the opposite.
Less than 10% of new cases are currently coming from known contacts, compared with the 90% to 95% level Africa CDC officials associate with effective control.
The gap is enormous.
It means many infected people are entering the surveillance system without anyone knowing where they acquired the infection.
That creates what epidemiologists call invisible transmission.
Invisible transmission is particularly dangerous because traditional outbreak statistics can create a false sense of precision. A health ministry may know exactly how many laboratory confirmed cases exist while having only a partial picture of how many infections are actually occurring.
This is why the estimate that only 30% to 40% of cases may be detected is so important.
The Role of War and Displacement
The Congo outbreak cannot be understood without considering the security environment in which it is unfolding.
Eastern Congo has endured years of armed conflict and population displacement. Families move because villages become unsafe. Roads become difficult to use. Health facilities may close. Medical workers may be unable to reach communities.
Every one of those factors can affect disease transmission.
Imagine an individual exposed to Ebola in one village who moves to another area because of fighting. The person may arrive somewhere where nobody knows about the original exposure. If symptoms appear, the local health system may initially suspect malaria, typhoid or another disease with similar early manifestations.
By the time Ebola is considered, additional people may have been exposed.
This is why conflict is not simply a humanitarian issue running alongside the epidemic. It is part of the epidemic's transmission environment.
The same structural problem appears in WorldAtNet's wider examination of public health capacity and health leadership in South East Asia . The geographical details are different, but the underlying principle is the same: health systems succeed when trained people, reliable infrastructure and community level institutions work together.
Health Workers on the Front Line
The people attempting to contain the epidemic are themselves becoming victims.
Around 160 health workers have reportedly been infected and 43 have died. International reporting has also documented hundreds of attacks and security incidents involving Ebola response teams.
That combination is devastating.
A nurse who becomes infected is not simply one additional case. The health system loses a trained professional at precisely the moment when demand for medical care is rising.
The result can become a vicious cycle. More cases create more pressure. More pressure increases the risk of mistakes. Mistakes can expose health workers. Infections reduce staffing. Reduced staffing makes the remaining response more difficult.
Protective equipment, infection prevention training, safe working conditions and timely salaries are therefore not administrative details.
They are epidemic control measures.
Misinformation and Public Distrust
A virus can be identified under a microscope. Fear cannot.
The Congo outbreak is being fought not only against a pathogen but against rumours, conspiracy theories, fear and distrust.
Some communities are reluctant to enter treatment centres because they fear isolation or believe that health workers are responsible for deaths. Others turn to traditional medicine first, delaying contact with Ebola treatment services.
These behaviours are understandable in communities that have experienced years of conflict and institutional mistrust, but they can make disease control dramatically harder.
The problem has an important parallel in modern scientific communication.
WorldAtNet's investigation into the fake science epidemic showed how rapidly misleading or questionable information can contaminate the environment in which genuine scientific evidence operates.
During an Ebola outbreak, the consequences can be immediate. A false claim about treatment can influence whether a sick person seeks care. A rumour about vaccines can determine whether a community accepts an intervention. A conspiracy theory about health workers can turn fear into hostility.
That makes communication part of clinical care.
Congo's Health System Under Pressure
The DRC has extensive experience fighting Ebola, but experience does not eliminate resource constraints.
An epidemic of this size requires laboratories, treatment centres, ambulances, protective equipment, trained clinicians, burial teams, epidemiologists and community health workers.
Every confirmed case creates additional demand for all of these services.
The pressure becomes particularly severe when patients arrive late. Severe cases require more intensive care and have a greater risk of death.
This is another reason why community engagement matters. The earlier patients arrive, the greater the opportunity for medical teams to provide supportive care and manage complications.
The issue connects directly with the broader global health inequality problem examined in WorldAtNet's analysis of unequal access to healthcare .
The world's most sophisticated medical technology has little value to someone living in an insecure village if there is no functioning road, laboratory or treatment centre within reach.
The International Response
The international response involves the World Health Organization, Africa CDC, the Congolese government, humanitarian agencies and research organisations.
The WHO has treated the outbreak as an international health emergency, reflecting concern over the speed and geographical expansion of transmission.
For continuing official information, readers should consult the World Health Organization's Disease Outbreak News , which provides official updates on major international infectious disease events.
The Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention is also central to regional surveillance and coordination.
The response is increasingly shifting toward community based surveillance, attempting to identify infections within villages rather than relying exclusively on people presenting at formal health facilities.
That strategy could become crucial if the current estimate of substantial under detection is correct.
The Funding Crisis Behind the Funding Crisis
There is a cruel irony at the heart of the current emergency. International donors have pledged substantial money, yet frontline responders are still facing shortages and delays.
Reuters reported that the available response funds could run out within weeks without additional support.
This is not simply an accounting problem.
Money pays for laboratories. It pays for fuel. It pays for protective equipment. It pays the people who trace contacts, transport patients and educate communities.
When funding becomes unreliable, every part of the response becomes slower.
The funding problem is therefore directly connected to the epidemiological problem.
A delayed payment can leave a treatment centre understaffed. An understaffed centre can struggle with infection prevention. Poor infection prevention can produce new cases.
In an exponential epidemic, those delays can become extremely expensive.
Could Ebola Spread Across Africa?
The answer is yes, but that does not mean a continental epidemic is inevitable.
The DRC shares borders with nine countries and has large populations moving across those borders for trade, family reasons and humanitarian displacement.
Uganda has already been affected by linked transmission.
Neighbouring countries therefore need surveillance systems capable of detecting imported cases rapidly.
That means trained health workers, diagnostic capacity and clear procedures for isolation and referral.
It also means public communication.
A country can have an excellent laboratory system and still struggle if people are afraid to report symptoms.
Regional cooperation is consequently one of the most important barriers between Congo's current crisis and a much wider African emergency.
INFOGRAPHIC 2: FIVE BARRIERS STANDING BETWEEN EBOLA AND CONTROL
Many infections may never enter the official surveillance system.
Unknown transmission chains make containment harder.
Insecurity prevents teams from reaching some communities.
Fear and misinformation can delay treatment.
Shortages threaten the continuity of the response.
Could It Become a Global Pandemic?
The prospect of global spread naturally raises memories of COVID 19. But Ebola and COVID 19 have fundamentally different transmission characteristics.
Ebola is not generally spread through casual airborne contact. Its primary transmission route involves direct contact with infected bodily fluids or contaminated materials.
That makes sustained global transmission considerably more difficult than with highly contagious respiratory viruses.
But international risk is not zero.
People travel. Health workers cross borders. Patients can move before diagnosis. A virus that spreads rapidly through a large population can occasionally travel internationally before authorities understand where the infection originated.
A confirmed Bundibugyo case was previously detected in France in a medical doctor who had worked in Congo, demonstrating that international surveillance is already relevant to this epidemic.
The correct response is therefore neither panic nor complacency.
It is preparedness.
The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's Ebola information provides continuing guidance on transmission, prevention and response, while the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control continues monitoring the regional and international implications.
The Economic Cost of a Prolonged Ebola Emergency
Ebola's economic damage can extend far beyond the direct cost of medical treatment.
When people fear infection, travel decreases. Markets can be disrupted. Workers may stay home. Schools can close. International organisations can reduce operations in affected areas.
For a country already facing conflict and humanitarian pressure, those consequences can become another layer of economic instability.
Households may lose income when a family member becomes sick. Small businesses may lose customers. Farmers may struggle to transport products.
The longer the outbreak continues, the greater these indirect costs become.
This is why epidemic prevention should be considered an economic investment rather than simply a healthcare expense.
Why Pakistan and South Asia Should Pay Attention
For Pakistan, the Congo outbreak may appear geographically distant. The epidemiological lesson, however, is remarkably close to home.
Pakistan has repeatedly confronted infectious disease threats, including dengue, polio and other communicable diseases. The country also has extensive international travel and a large mobile population.
The lesson from Congo is not that Pakistan should expect an Ebola outbreak.
It is that health systems must be capable of detecting unusual infections rapidly.
Airport surveillance, laboratory capacity, infection control and transparent public communication all matter.
The country's experience with other diseases also demonstrates the importance of community trust.
A health authority can issue the world's best guidance, but it cannot implement that guidance without public cooperation.
This is particularly important in an era when social media can transform an unverified claim into a national rumour within hours.
WorldAtNet's recent reporting on the hidden health risks of ultra processed foods illustrates another side of the same public health challenge: science can identify risks, but communicating those risks clearly and credibly is essential if people are expected to act on them.
Lessons From COVID 19
The world learned during COVID 19 that an outbreak in one region can eventually become a problem everywhere.
But the most important lesson is not simply that diseases cross borders.
It is that delay is expensive.
When a small outbreak is detected early, governments can deploy targeted interventions. When transmission becomes widespread, every intervention becomes more complicated and expensive.
The Congo Ebola outbreak is therefore an argument for investing in global health systems before emergencies occur.
That investment includes laboratories and vaccines, but also nurses, community health workers, epidemiologists, communication specialists and emergency financing.
The principle is simple: global health security is only as strong as the weakest health system facing the next outbreak.
That argument also connects with WorldAtNet's reporting on public health leadership and health system capacity in South East Asia.
Three Possible Futures
Scenario One: Congo Regains Control
The most optimistic outcome would see surveillance expand, contact tracing improve, communities cooperate more closely with health teams and international financing reach the front lines. If the majority of transmission chains become visible, the epidemic could eventually decline.
Scenario Two: A Prolonged Congo Emergency
A second possibility is that the epidemic remains concentrated largely inside Congo but continues for months. This would place enormous pressure on the country's health system and humanitarian infrastructure while creating recurring risks of imported cases into neighbouring countries.
Scenario Three: Regional Expansion
The most serious scenario would involve sustained transmission across several neighbouring countries. That would dramatically increase the logistical and financial requirements of the international response.
Even that scenario would not automatically mean a worldwide pandemic. But it would represent a much larger global health emergency.
INFOGRAPHIC 3: HOW A LOCAL OUTBREAK BECOMES A GLOBAL RISK
Transmission begins within communities.
Cases remain invisible to surveillance.
Conflict and travel create new transmission routes.
Neighbouring countries activate emergency surveillance.
International organisations mobilise resources and expertise.
The earlier the chain is broken, the smaller the international risk.
Key Takeaways
- The Democratic Republic of Congo is experiencing its largest Ebola outbreak ever recorded.
- The latest reported figures stand at 5,290 confirmed cases and 2,516 deaths.
- Africa CDC estimates that only 30% to 40% of cases may currently be detected.
- Less than 10% of cases are currently linked to known contacts.
- The outbreak is caused by Bundibugyo virus.
- There is no vaccine specifically licensed for Bundibugyo virus.
- Seventy thousand Ervebo vaccine doses are being allocated for research and frontline protection, but its effectiveness against Bundibugyo remains under investigation.
- Conflict and displacement are making surveillance and contact tracing more difficult.
- Health workers are suffering substantial infections and deaths.
- Misinformation and distrust are weakening the response.
- Neighbouring countries face a genuine but manageable cross border risk.
- The outbreak does not mean a COVID 19 style global pandemic is inevitable.
- Early detection, community trust, international financing and regional cooperation remain the most important tools for containment.
Conclusion: The World Cannot Afford to Look Away
The Congo Ebola outbreak has reached a point where ignoring it would be a serious mistake.
More than 5,000 confirmed cases and more than 2,500 deaths have already been recorded, making this the largest Ebola epidemic in the country's history. Yet the confirmed numbers may represent only a fraction of the actual transmission occurring across affected communities.
That is the central danger.
Ebola is most controllable when health authorities know where the virus is moving. When contacts are known, patients can be isolated and exposed people monitored. When transmission chains disappear into communities, the response becomes reactive rather than preventive.
Congo is currently struggling with precisely that problem.
The situation is made harder by armed conflict, displacement, damaged infrastructure, public distrust and funding shortages. The people attempting to solve the crisis are themselves becoming infected, while attacks against response teams further undermine the effort.
Yet there is still reason for cautious optimism.
The international community has experience with Ebola. Congo has experienced health workers and outbreak specialists. Regional institutions such as Africa CDC have developed considerably since the West African crisis. New vaccine research is underway, and existing medical tools are being evaluated for possible cross protection.
The question is whether those resources will arrive quickly enough.
The lesson extends far beyond Ebola.
The world often treats infectious disease preparedness as an expense that can be postponed until the next crisis. Congo demonstrates why that approach is dangerous.
A functioning laboratory today may prevent thousands of infections tomorrow. A trained health worker today may prevent an entire transmission chain. A trustworthy community engagement programme today may prevent a family from hiding a suspected case tomorrow.
Prevention is rarely dramatic. It does not generate the same headlines as an emergency.
But it saves lives.
The Congo epidemic is therefore not only a test for one country. It is a test for the global health system itself.
If the international community helps Congo regain control before transmission expands further, the outbreak may eventually become a story of successful containment.
If support arrives too slowly, the world may instead watch another local health crisis become much harder, more expensive and more dangerous to control.
The choice is still available.
The most responsible strategy is obvious: detect more cases, trace more contacts, protect health workers, finance the response and earn the trust of communities.
The world should not wait until Ebola reaches another continent before deciding that Congo's emergency deserves urgent attention.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is Ebola currently spreading in Congo?
Yes. Congo is experiencing a major outbreak of Bundibugyo virus disease. The latest figures available on August 21, 2026, show 5,290 confirmed cases and 2,516 deaths.
Is this Congo's largest Ebola outbreak?
Yes. The current epidemic has surpassed the country's previous largest Ebola outbreak, which occurred between 2018 and 2020.
What virus is causing the outbreak?
The outbreak is caused by Bundibugyo virus, a distinct species within the Ebola virus family.
Is there a vaccine for Bundibugyo virus?
There is currently no vaccine specifically licensed for Bundibugyo virus. The Ervebo vaccine, licensed for Zaire ebolavirus, is being evaluated for possible protection against Bundibugyo.
Could Ebola become another COVID 19?
There is no evidence that the current outbreak will inevitably become a COVID 19 style global pandemic. Ebola's principal transmission routes differ substantially from those of highly contagious respiratory viruses.
Why is contact tracing so important?
Contact tracing allows health authorities to identify people who may have been exposed and monitor them before they unknowingly spread the virus further.
Why is the Congo outbreak so difficult to control?
The response is being complicated by conflict, population displacement, weak infrastructure, misinformation, attacks on health workers, limited contact tracing and funding shortages.
Should people in Pakistan be worried?
There is no reason for the general public in Pakistan to panic because of the Congo outbreak. However, the situation reinforces the importance of disease surveillance, laboratory preparedness and rapid response to imported infections.
Related WorldAtNet Reading
The Congo Ebola crisis connects naturally with several previously published WorldAtNet investigations into global health, medical science and public health.
- The Unequal Cure: How Healthcare Inequality Is Killing Millions Who Needn't Die
- WHO Launches 2026 Public Health Champion Initiative
- The Fake Science Epidemic: How an AI Tool Uncovered 250,000 Suspect Cancer Papers
- The Hidden Health Risks of Ultra Processed Foods
- Heart Disease Deaths Have Fallen by Half, but Nine in Ten Remain Preventable
Authoritative Sources
For continuing updates, readers should rely on primary public health organisations rather than social media claims.
WorldAtNet Editorial Perspective
The Congo Ebola emergency demonstrates an uncomfortable truth about global health: the world does not become safer simply because wealthy countries possess advanced laboratories and sophisticated medicines. Global health security depends on whether those capabilities can reach vulnerable communities quickly enough.
Containing Ebola in Congo is therefore not only a humanitarian responsibility. It is one of the most practical investments the international community can make in protecting itself from the next infectious disease emergency.
WorldAtNet
Global Perspective for a Changing World
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