Inside FIFA’s Power Struggle: How Money, Governance and Control Are Reshaping World Football

 

A record World Cup, a scrapped plan to sell a slice of it, a red card that reached the White House, and an election that may decide who really runs the game.

By WorldAtNet Editorial Desk · Sports and Global Affairs · Updated September 29, 2026

For a few weeks this summer, world football looked like a triumph. Forty eight teams, 104 matches, three host nations and a final that Spain won against Argentina. The tournament produced revenue on a scale the sport had never seen. Then, almost before the confetti had been swept away, the story turned. A plan leaked to sell a fifth of a new FIFA commercial company to private investors. Within days, European federations were threatening to boycott FIFA competitions altogether, senior staff were distancing themselves from their own president, and the language used by football’s leaders became startlingly blunt.

That fight is still going on. As of this week, FIFA president Gianni Infantino says he will seek a fourth term, his critics are hunting for a challenger, the FIFA Council is preparing to consider a governance review, and a disciplinary decision about one American striker has become a symbol of something much larger. Underneath the headlines sits an old question that never really went away after the scandals of 2015: who controls world football, and who answers to whom?

This article walks through the story in order. It explains how FIFA is built, where its money comes from, how power has gathered around one office, what happened at and after the 2026 World Cup, and what the coming months could change. It tries to be fair to all sides, because the facts are still moving and several key claims remain disputed.

Table of Contents

1. Facts at a Glance
2. Key Takeaways
3. How FIFA Is Built: 211 Votes and One Powerful Office
4. The Money Machine
5. A Decade of Consolidation
6. Summer 2026: A World Cup and Its Discontents
7. The Balogun Affair
8. FIFA Forward Enterprise: The Plan to Sell a Piece of the World Cup
9. The Backlash
10. The Governance Review and the Council Meeting
11. The 2027 Election and the Arithmetic of Power
12. Money, Politics and Control: The Deeper Questions
13. What Real Reform Could Look Like
14. Conclusion
15. Related Articles on WorldAtNet
16. Sources and Notes

Facts at a Glance

• Who leads FIFA: Gianni Infantino, president since February 26, 2016, formerly general secretary of UEFA.
• Membership: 211 member associations, each with one vote at the FIFA Congress.
• The plan that ignited the crisis: FIFA Forward Enterprise (FFE), a subsidiary to run FIFA’s commercial business, valued at about 20 billion dollars, with roughly 20 percent to be sold to private investors to raise about 4.2 billion dollars.
• Anchor investor named: Thrive Eternal, a fund launched by Joshua Kushner, brother of Jared Kushner, who is a son in law of US President Donald Trump.
• Outcome: Infantino announced on a Friday, days after the plan was unveiled, that the proposal “will not proceed.” UEFA’s 55 members had voted to boycott FIFA events over it.
• Revenue: FIFA’s 2019 to 2022 cycle brought in about 7.57 billion dollars. The 2023 to 2026 cycle was revised to around 13 billion dollars, and Infantino has said revenue would top 15 billion.
• The Balogun case: US striker Folarin Balogun received a straight red card in the round of 32. FIFA’s disciplinary committee suspended his one match ban for a year, and Trump confirmed he had asked Infantino to review it. Belgium beat the US 4 to 1 in the next round.
• Next dates: FIFA Council meeting in Zurich on October 15, 2026. Candidate nominations close November 18, 2026. Presidential election at the 77th FIFA Congress in Rabat, Morocco, on March 18, 2027.
• Election history: Infantino’s only contested election was in 2016, when he beat Sheikh Salman bin Ebrahim Al Khalifa 115 votes to 88 in the second round. He was unopposed in 2019 and 2023.

Key Takeaways

• FIFA is legally a nonprofit association, but its business is now one of the largest commercial operations in sport, and that tension sits at the heart of the current fight.
• The failed FFE plan did not create the governance problem. It exposed it, by showing how a major strategic decision could be prepared for months with little visibility for the Council, the confederations or even senior staff.
• The Balogun episode matters less for one match than for what it suggests: that political pressure can reach a body FIFA describes as independent.
• Europe has the loudest voice, but the votes sit elsewhere. Winning a FIFA election means building a coalition across all confederations, and many associations depend heavily on FIFA money.
• The October 15 Council meeting will show whether the promised external review has real reach, especially whether it can examine what already happened and not only future rules.
• The deepest issue is not one man. Even critics say the problem goes beyond a single individual and concerns how much authority any FIFA president should hold.

How FIFA Is Built: 211 Votes and One Powerful Office

To understand the crisis, you need a clear picture of how FIFA is organised, because its structure explains both why Infantino has been so hard to dislodge and why he is now under such pressure.

FIFA is a Swiss association. Its supreme body is the Congress, where each of the 211 member associations casts one vote, whether the country is Germany or a tiny island nation. The Congress elects the president, approves accounts and amends the statutes. Between Congresses, the FIFA Council, made up of 37 members drawn from the confederations, takes the major decisions. Independent judicial and ethics bodies exist to handle discipline and misconduct, and the statutes formally separate their work from the political and administrative side.

On paper this looks balanced. In practice, several features tilt the field. One vote per association means that Europe and South America, home to the richest leagues and the most famous clubs, hold only a minority of the votes. Reporting from the 2023 election noted that the two continents combined held 65 of the 211. The rest of the membership includes many associations that rely on FIFA for a large share of their funding, through development programmes, tournament payments and the distributions that flow from the World Cup. That gives the president a broad base of support among countries that value predictability and money over the concerns of the big European leagues.

The presidency itself also carries unusual practical power. The president chairs the Council, is the public face of the organisation, sets its strategic direction and controls the agenda to a large degree. FIFA’s own supporters argue this is efficient and accountable, because the president answers to the member associations who elected him. Critics respond that the same structure lets a determined president move fast, before other bodies can properly scrutinise a decision.

Keep that tension in mind. A structure that rewards decisiveness can also weaken oversight, and the events of 2026 test exactly that.

The Money Machine

FIFA plans its finances in four year cycles rather than by calendar year, because almost all of its income arrives around the men’s World Cup. Broadcast rights, sponsorship, ticketing and hospitality all peak in the tournament year, and the earlier years are usually loss making as FIFA spends on development, infrastructure and preparation.

The size of the numbers has grown dramatically. The 2019 to 2022 cycle, which ended with the Qatar World Cup, generated a record of about 7.57 billion dollars. For the 2023 to 2026 cycle, FIFA first budgeted around 11 billion dollars, then revised the projection to roughly 13 billion. Analysts credited much of the increase to the new expanded Club World Cup in 2025, which was not in the original budget, and to the enlarged 48 team World Cup itself, which was expected to bring in around 8.9 billion dollars directly. After the tournament, Infantino told member associations that revenue was set to top 15 billion dollars for the cycle, and reporting indicates FIFA is already counting on around 14 billion for the next cycle.

Where does the money come from? Broadcast rights are the largest single source, projected above 4 billion dollars for the cycle. Sponsorship is projected at roughly 2.8 billion. Matchday revenue, including tickets and hospitality, was projected far above the Qatar figure, in the region of 3 billion dollars, helped by the sheer number of matches and by the decision to sell tickets in the United States market at what Infantino later called market rates.

FIFA insists that these sums are reinvested in the game. It points to the payments made to every participating team, with even teams knocked out in the group stage guaranteed several million dollars, and to the development funds that reach associations around the world. That is a real and important part of the picture. Many small federations could not run national teams, youth programmes or women’s football without FIFA money.

But a large pile of money invites large questions. Who decides how it is spent? Who checks the decisions? And should a body that describes itself as a nonprofit devoted to developing the sport think about turning its crown jewels into a product that outside investors can own? That last question is what the FFE plan forced onto the table.

A Decade of Consolidation

The current fight makes more sense against the backdrop of the past ten years. Infantino took office in February 2016, in the wreckage of the corruption scandals that had ended the long reign of Sepp Blatter. He won the presidency in a contested election, beating Sheikh Salman bin Ebrahim Al Khalifa in a second round, and he promised a cleaner, more transparent FIFA.

Supporters point to real changes in the years that followed: more money flowing to member associations, an expanded World Cup that gave every region more places, and tournaments that, on the pitch and in the stadiums, were widely seen as successful. His allies argue that he brought stability to an organisation that had lost public trust.

Critics have long pointed to a different pattern. In 2017, the FIFA Council chaired by Infantino recommended replacing the two men who led the ethics investigation and adjudication bodies, Cornel Borbely and Hans Joachim Eckert. One of them said the move amounted to the end of the reform process. Congress approved the replacements. Infantino, for his part, told delegates that the corruption crisis was over.

Then came a series of big ideas that tended to collide with the traditional structure of the game. In 2018, Infantino promoted a proposal, backed by an investment consortium reported to be offering 25 billion dollars over twelve years for a 49 percent stake, to create a new Club World Cup and a global Nations League. Then UEFA president Aleksander Ceferin called it cynical mercantilism and accused FIFA of selling the soul of the game. FIFA later suggested other bidders could take part. The idea faded, but the pattern was clear: Infantino was willing to explore radical commercial structures, and European bodies were prepared to resist.

In 2023, the European Leagues network also filed a formal complaint at the European Commission in Brussels against what it called abusive FIFA governance standards. That step matters, because it shows that the current dispute has deep roots. The 2026 crisis did not appear from nowhere. It is the latest and sharpest chapter in a long argument about how much control FIFA should have over the business of football.

Summer 2026: A World Cup and Its Discontents

The 2026 World Cup, hosted jointly by the United States, Mexico and Canada, was meant to be the crowning event of Infantino’s tenure. In many respects it delivered. The revenue was enormous, and the tournament added new fans in North America. But it was also described by some as one of the most controversial in history.

Ticket prices were an early flashpoint. FIFA used market based pricing for many matches, and even players spoke up. US midfielder Timothy Weah said tickets were too expensive, a comment that drew a defensive reaction from his own manager and a backlash from American fans. In May, Infantino defended the approach, saying FIFA had to apply market rates. Empty seats at several matches led many observers to link them to those prices.

None of this would have threatened Infantino’s position on its own. Large tournaments always generate complaints. What changed the mood was what happened next, in two separate episodes that, taken together, shifted the debate from money to power.

The Balogun Affair

The first episode began on the pitch. In the round of 32, United States striker Folarin Balogun was shown a straight red card in a win over Bosnia and Herzegovina. Under the tournament rules, a straight red carries an automatic one match suspension, which would have kept him out of the round of 16 tie against Belgium.

Instead, FIFA’s disciplinary committee suspended the execution of the ban for a year, using its authority under Article 27 of the disciplinary code. The red card itself was not overturned, but Balogun was cleared to play. He did, for almost the whole match, and Belgium won 4 to 1.

The controversy exploded when President Trump acknowledged that he had personally contacted Infantino and asked for the incident to be reviewed. The Guardian reported that Trump made three calls. Infantino said he spoke with Trump, explained that there was an ongoing process involving FIFA’s independent judicial bodies, and insisted that the case would be decided by the competent bodies. FIFA’s disciplinary committee chair issued a statement confirming that the red card itself stood. Infantino denies any involvement in the disciplinary decision.

Critics were not satisfied. Belgium’s federation asked publicly for answers and was told its appeal was inadmissible. Reports said the decision to suspend the ban was taken by the committee chair alone, without consulting the other members, and that the explanation given, a reference to Article 27, did not persuade many observers that the process was routine. The campaign group FairSquare asked the International Olympic Committee to investigate Infantino’s role, arguing that sports bodies must be free from political influence.

What makes this episode so important for the wider governance debate is the principle involved. FIFA’s judicial bodies are supposed to be independent of its politics. Whether or not Infantino influenced the decision, and he says he did not, the sequence of a presidential phone call from a head of state followed by an unprecedented ruling created an appearance problem that FIFA has not managed to dispel. Months later, the Royal Belgian Football Association said its questions were still unanswered, withdrew its support for Infantino, and asked for the matter to be discussed at the October 15 Council meeting. Belgium’s federation has said it will not back him for another term without satisfactory answers.

It is worth stating plainly what is and is not established. It is established that Trump called and that the ban was suspended. It is not established, and Infantino firmly rejects, that he directed the outcome. The dispute is about process, transparency and trust.

FIFA Forward Enterprise: The Plan to Sell a Piece of the World Cup

The second episode was far bigger. In the days after the tournament ended, FIFA unveiled a proposal that would have reshaped its finances and its identity. Under the plan, FIFA would create a subsidiary called FIFA Forward Enterprise. It would bring together the sale of FIFA’s commercial rights, including broadcasting, sponsorship, ticketing and licensing, with the operational delivery of its tournaments, covering both the men’s and women’s World Cups and Club World Cups.

The subsidiary would have been valued at about 20 billion dollars, with roughly 20 percent sold to private investors to raise around 4.2 billion. The anchor investor named was Thrive Eternal, the fund launched by Joshua Kushner. That detail added a political dimension, because of the family connection to the American president and the earlier Balogun controversy.

FIFA’s argument was that the money would strengthen member associations and support the sport worldwide, especially in countries where support is most needed, and that the project would proceed only if a majority of member associations supported it after consultation. Infantino later said the plan was designed to be put through an institutional process and that it entered the public domain earlier than planned, before it could be presented in full to the Council.

That last point is the heart of the governance complaint. Several people inside FIFA said they had not known. Chief operating officer Kevin Lamour said in a statement to the Associated Press that FIFA staff were deceived by Infantino’s lack of openness in planning the sale over recent months and that the project must not continue. Two of the organisation’s most senior figures, secretary general Mattias Grafstrom and chief of global football development Arsene Wenger, distanced themselves from the plan. Wenger said he first learned of it through media reports and wrote that withdrawing it was absolutely necessary, because he believes in an independent FIFA. A top FIFA adviser, Carlos Cordeiro, resigned, saying he could not stand by while FIFA considered selling a stake in the World Cup.

The decision to plan a project of this scale, with a named investor, mostly out of sight of those who would normally be consulted, is what turned an ambitious commercial idea into a governance scandal. Even if the idea had merit, the process gave critics their strongest argument.

The Backlash

The reaction was fast and fierce. UEFA, Concacaf and the Asian Football Confederation rejected the plan outright. UEFA’s 55 member associations agreed to boycott the World Cup and all other FIFA competitions if it went ahead. UEFA said the World Cup is not an investment product and accused FIFA of putting the soul of the sport up for sale. It later described the episode as a profound failure of leadership and an abdication of FIFA’s duty as custodian of world football.

The response carried extra weight because of who was speaking. Infantino spent years working at UEFA and served as its general secretary before becoming FIFA president. Hearing that body accuse him of a betrayal of football’s values was a striking reversal.

Within days, Infantino withdrew the proposal, saying it had created divisions that were no longer in the interest of the objective set out in the first place. But withdrawal did not end the crisis. UEFA said it had lost confidence in FIFA’s leadership even after the plan was scrapped. Concacaf and UEFA said they would look for ways to stop any future attempt. In August, European nations suspended the boycott threat after receiving assurances that the plan had been permanently withdrawn and would not return in any other shape or form, but the push against Infantino himself continued.

The pressure did not stay confined to federations. Reports emerged that UEFA was preparing a criminal complaint connected to the plan. The English Football Association chair, Debbie Hewitt, wrote to Infantino demanding the release of all documents relating to both the FFE plan and the Balogun case. And this past Friday, the Premier League joined the top leagues of Spain, Italy and Germany in a statement calling for governance reform. They said football had suffered one of the biggest abuses of power in FIFA’s history, accused Infantino of promoting exploitative ideas rather than safeguarding against them, and criticised what they called relentless expansionism. Notably, the leagues did not follow UEFA in specifically calling for him to step down. Instead they said the moment had come to decide not only who leads FIFA, but how it should be led, and asked presidential candidates to stand on a manifesto of fundamental reform.

That last idea is the most important. The leagues framed the problem as bigger than one person. That framing opens the door to a debate about structure, which may outlast whoever wins the election.

The Governance Review and the Council Meeting

Under mounting pressure, Infantino changed tack. In a letter sent on Monday, September 21, to Council members and all 211 member associations, he indicated that he would ask the Council whether it wishes to commission an external, independent assessment of FIFA’s current governance framework for major strategic initiatives, with recommendations for improvement. He also proposed a direct, structured and time bound consultation with the confederations and member associations on how to strengthen FIFA’s decision making. He said he was fully committed to leading FIFA.

The offer marks a shift, but it has not ended the argument. Several Council members reportedly want the terms of reference expanded to cover two specific matters: the abandoned FFE project and the Balogun case. One member told the Guardian that without a retrospective analysis of those two episodes, any governance review would lack credibility. Another suggested that Infantino was trying to avoid personal scrutiny by offering to examine structures going forward rather than the controversies of the recent past.

There is an institutional subtlety here. Reviewing the governance around the Balogun decision would not automatically reopen the disciplinary case, since FIFA’s statutes separate the political and administrative functions from the powers of the independent judicial bodies. A review could assess procedures, controls and the allocation of responsibilities without overturning any ruling. That distinction may help find a compromise, but it also shows how sensitive the question is.

The decision belongs to the Council, which meets in Zurich on October 15. The outcome will be a useful signal. If the Council approves a review with broad scope and real independence, including the power to look back, that would suggest the institution is willing to examine itself. If the review is narrow, forward looking and controlled by the president’s office, critics will say nothing has changed.

The 2027 Election and the Arithmetic of Power

The election is where the struggle will finally be settled. The vote is set for March 18, 2027, at the 77th FIFA Congress in Rabat, Morocco. Infantino announced at the Congress in Vancouver on April 30, 2026, that he would seek a fourth term, and FIFA has confirmed that he will stand regardless of whether he faces a direct challenge. If he wins, he would be eligible to serve through 2031.

Before the FFE crisis, he had been expected to run unopposed. Now the picture is far more open. The deadline for nominations is November 18, and any candidate needs the support of at least five member associations, then must pass FIFA’s eligibility and integrity checks. No rival had formally entered the race as of mid September.

The name mentioned most often is Victor Montagliani, the Canadian president of Concacaf, who is widely discussed as a possible challenger. UEFA’s own president, Ceferin, has ruled himself out, saying his credibility is higher if he is not interested in the position. Other names have circulated in football politics, but they should be treated as speculation until nominations are formally submitted. Several European federations, including Germany, Spain and Norway, are reportedly discussing backing a candidate.

Here the arithmetic matters. Criticising Infantino is far easier than defeating him. The membership is global, and he has cultivated a strong base in Africa and among associations that benefit from FIFA’s development money. Individual nations have reiterated their support in recent weeks, and the Saudi federation said it backed him for now. UEFA reportedly considered a no confidence vote, which would have needed a very high threshold of 159 votes, and dropped the idea in favour of finding a single credible challenger. Opponents also have another route: written requests from one fifth of the membership, 43 associations, can trigger an Extraordinary Congress before March.

Some senior figures now see the crisis shifting from the question of succession to a struggle over the terms of his continued presidency. The Japan Times reported this week that Infantino looks set to stay, but that the war over how much power he can exercise may only be beginning. That observation seems right. Even if he wins in March, he may face a Council, a set of confederations and a group of powerful leagues that are determined to limit the way he governs.

Money, Politics and Control: The Deeper Questions

Step back from the dates and the quotes, and three deeper questions emerge.

First, what is FIFA for? Its statutes and its public messaging describe a nonprofit that develops the game and reinvests its earnings. Yet the size of its revenue and the ambition of its commercial plans make it look increasingly like a global entertainment company. Neither description is wrong, but they pull in different directions. A nonprofit answers to its members and its mission. A company that sells stakes to investors answers, at least in part, to shareholders who want returns. The FFE plan would have blurred that line sharply. Even the promise of consultation could not hide the fact that the project would have moved control of the sport’s most valuable events toward a for profit structure.

Second, how independent is FIFA from politics? The Balogun episode showed how close political power can come to a football decision. Earlier, comments in which Infantino urged people to support President Trump’s agenda drew criticism from a former FIFA governance committee chairman, Miguel Maduro, who argued they breached FIFA’s political neutrality rules. FIFA’s relationship with the current American administration is also shaped by the fact that the United States hosted the biggest event in the organisation’s history. A governing body that depends on host governments will always feel pressure to be accommodating. What matters is whether it has rules and habits that protect its judicial bodies when that pressure arrives.

Third, who speaks for the game? Football is played by hundreds of millions of people, but its governance is decided by a small number of officials. Europe has the richest clubs and the biggest broadcast audiences, but it has a minority of votes. Much of the rest of the world receives support from FIFA and votes accordingly. There is nothing improper in that, but it means that the European view, however loudly expressed, cannot alone decide the outcome. It also means that critics who want change need to persuade associations in Africa, Asia, the Americas and Oceania that reform serves their interests, not only Europe’s.

Supporters of Infantino make a serious counterargument. They say he has increased revenue, expanded opportunity and delivered money to associations that never had it. They note that the leagues and UEFA have their own commercial interests, and that European resistance to a bigger World Cup or new tournaments can look like protecting the existing order. There is truth in that. A fair reading recognises that both sides have interests to defend.

What Real Reform Could Look Like

If the review goes ahead and the next election is contested, what changes would actually address the problems exposed this year? Several ideas are already circulating, and others follow from the record so far.

A clear rule for major strategic decisions. The FFE plan would have been very different if the statutes required that any proposal to sell or restructure FIFA’s core commercial rights be presented to the Council and the confederations before contracts were negotiated or investors named. A formal gateway, with deadlines and documentation, would make surprise decisions harder.

Protected independence for judicial bodies. The Balogun case suggests that the rules on suspending sanctions are too loose. Requiring a full panel, written reasons and publication of decisions would reduce suspicion. It would also protect the judges, who are the people most exposed when a political call arrives.

An external review with real reach. Whatever the Council decides on October 15, credibility will depend on independence, access to documents and a mandate to examine the recent past. A review that cannot look at FFE or Balogun will be hard to take seriously.

None of these changes would be simple. Each would face resistance from those who benefit from the current arrangement. But the fact that leagues, federations, staff and Council members have all called for some form of reform suggests that the appetite exists.

Conclusion

FIFA’s crisis is easy to describe as a personal fight between a president and his critics. That description misses most of what matters. The FFE plan, the Balogun affair, the ticket prices and the leagues’ statement of last Friday all point to the same underlying issue: a governing body whose revenue, reach and ambition have outgrown the checks that surround it.

The facts as they stand are these. A plan to sell a fifth of a new FIFA commercial company was launched, opposed by half the confederations and by senior staff, and withdrawn within days. A red card suspension was lifted after the American president admitted calling FIFA’s leader, and no one has yet given a fully convincing account of how the decision was made. Infantino says he will seek another term, offers an external governance review, and insists he is committed to leading FIFA. His opponents want more than a review. They want answers about the past and a manifesto for the future, and they are still searching for a candidate who can unite them.

What happens next is genuinely uncertain. The Council may agree to a broad review or a narrow one. A challenger may emerge before November 18, or the field may stay empty. Infantino may win comfortably in Rabat, or he may find that the vote has become a referendum on how FIFA is run. What seems clear is that the argument will not end with the election. The question of how much power one office should hold over the world’s most popular sport has been raised in public, by the people who know FIFA best. It is unlikely to go away.

For anyone who cares about football, the practical lesson is simple. Watch the Council meeting on October 15. Watch who files a nomination by November 18. And watch whether the reforms promised in a moment of pressure survive after the pressure has passed. The future of the game’s governance will be decided by those details, far more than by any one speech.

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Sources and Notes

This article draws on reporting by the Associated Press, ESPN, Sky Sports, TIME, The Guardian, the Irish Times, Euronews, Inside The Games, Sports Illustrated and Yahoo Sports, as well as FIFA’s own statements, covering events through September 28, 2026. Revenue figures are FIFA projections and press estimates and may change when audited results are published. Claims about the Balogun decision come from press reports and public statements. Infantino denies any involvement in the disciplinary outcome, and FIFA’s disciplinary committee says the red card itself was not overturned. Nothing in this article alleges wrongdoing that has not been formally established. Developments after the date above, including the October 15 Council decision, are not covered.