Israel After Netanyahu's Electoral Setback: Can a New Government Change the Course of the Palestinian Conflict?

 

WorldAtNet | Flagship Analysis | Updated 2 November 2026

Israel's 27 October 2026 election has produced a political turning point, but not the decisive transfer of power that many of Benjamin Netanyahu's opponents had hoped for. The prime minister's Likud party emerged as the largest individual party, yet the right wing and religious bloc supporting him failed to secure a parliamentary majority. The opposition, led by former military chief Gadi Eisenkot, also fell short of the numbers required to govern independently. Arab-led parties secured a substantial parliamentary presence and now occupy a potentially decisive position in the negotiations.

The outcome has created a paradox. Netanyahu has lost the parliamentary majority that sustained his government, but he has not been removed from office. His opponents have a numerical opportunity to replace him, but they disagree over whether they can rely on Arab parties. The result is a political contest in which the prime minister's survival may depend less on winning the election than on the inability of his rivals to agree on an alternative.

Beyond Israel's domestic politics, the consequences could be profound. The next government will influence the future of Gaza, Israeli military operations, settlement policy in the occupied West Bank, Palestinian statehood, relations with Arab governments and the confrontation with Iran. It will also determine whether Israel attempts to repair its international standing or continues along a path of diplomatic isolation and regional confrontation.

Yet one distinction must guide any serious assessment: removing Netanyahu is not the same as changing Israel's national policy. A new prime minister may change the language of diplomacy, the composition of the cabinet and the country's international relationships. But the underlying questions of territory, security, settlements, Palestinian self determination and the future of Gaza cannot be resolved simply by changing the person occupying the prime minister's office.

This article examines the election outcome, the agendas of the principal political forces, the possible coalition arrangements, Netanyahu's remaining options, the legal authority to continue military operations, the prospects for Palestinian policy change, the role of Arab governments and the scenarios that could shape Israel's next political chapter.

Israel's election has created a difficult coalition contest with major implications for Palestinian policy and regional security. Image: WorldAtNet editorial illustration.

Table of Contents

1. Facts at a Glance
2. What the Election Actually Decided
3. How Israel Forms a Government
4. The Parties and Their Political Agendas
5. Netanyahu's Political Survival Options
6. Six Possible Coalition Arrangements
7. Would a New Government Change Policy Towards Palestine?
8. Gaza: The Most Difficult Test
9. The West Bank and Settlement Policy
10. Can Israel Continue Military Operations Through a War Cabinet?
11. What the Election Means for Iran
12. The Arab World and the Arab League
13. The United States and International Pressure
14. Netanyahu's Legal and Political Accountability
15. Six Possible Political Scenarios
16. What to Watch Next
17. Key Takeaways
18. Conclusion
19. Frequently Asked Questions
20. Five Related WorldAtNet Articles
21. Sources and Further Reading

Facts at a Glance

Indicator	Position as of 2 November 2026
Election date	27 October 2026
Parliament	120 member Knesset
Majority required	61 seats
Likud seats	27
Netanyahu aligned bloc	53 seats
Main opposition bloc	48 seats
Arab led parties	19 seats
Prime minister	Benjamin Netanyahu remains in office while a new government is formed.
Opposition leader	Gadi Eisenkot, leader of Yashar.
President	Isaac Herzog, responsible for assigning the task of forming a government.
Official publication of results	Scheduled by the Central Elections Committee for 4 November.
Expected new Knesset session	10 November.
Main political obstacle	The opposition needs cooperation or outside support from Arab led parties, but some potential partners reject such cooperation.
Central policy question	Whether a change of government will produce meaningful changes in Gaza, the West Bank and Palestinian statehood policy.

Note: The 53, 48 and 19 seat distribution is reported by the Associated Press as the final election result. The Israeli Central Elections Committee's timetable nevertheless provides for formal publication of certified results by 4 November. The bloc figures describe political groupings, not three formal parliamentary parties.

1. What the Election Actually Decided

The election produced three important political outcomes. First, Likud remained Israel's largest individual party, with 27 seats. Second, the coalition of right wing, far right and ultra Orthodox parties associated with Netanyahu fell to 53 seats, eight short of the 61 needed for a majority. Third, the opposition bloc associated with Gadi Eisenkot secured 48 seats, while Arab-led parties won the remaining 19.

These figures explain why the result is neither a straightforward Netanyahu victory nor a straightforward opposition victory. The prime minister's bloc finished ahead of the main opposition grouping, but it cannot govern alone. The opposition has a larger potential parliamentary pool if it can secure Arab party cooperation, but it has not demonstrated that its members are willing to work together under a common governing agreement.

The arithmetic of power

Israel's Knesset has 120 members. A government normally needs the confidence of at least 61 members to establish a stable parliamentary majority. The election therefore leaves the country with a fragmented political landscape.

Political grouping	Seats	Distance from 61
Netanyahu aligned bloc	53	8 seats short
Main opposition bloc	48	13 seats short
Arab led parties	19	Potential support for an alternative majority
Total Knesset	120	61 required for a majority

The opposition's potential numerical advantage is significant. Its 48 seats combined with all 19 Arab-led seats would produce 67. But parliamentary arithmetic does not automatically create a functioning government. Parties must agree on a prime minister, ministerial responsibilities, budget priorities, security policy and the fundamental questions of Israel's identity and future direction.

Why Netanyahu has not been removed

Israeli voters elect members of parliament through proportional representation. They do not directly elect the prime minister in a separate nationwide presidential style vote. The prime minister therefore remains in office while the process of forming a new government takes place.

Netanyahu's political position has weakened because his coalition no longer has a majority. But he still leads the largest party and may be considered by President Isaac Herzog as a candidate to form the next government. The opposition must demonstrate that it can assemble a more viable parliamentary arrangement.

The Associated Press reported that the final distribution left Netanyahu's bloc at 53 seats, the main opposition at 48 and Arab-led parties at 19. It also reported that opposition leader Avigdor Lieberman had ruled out partnering with Arab-led parties, complicating efforts to replace Netanyahu.

For the latest political background, read WorldAtNet's earlier report, Israel Election 2026: Netanyahu's Political Future, the War Cabinet, Palestine and the Arab World's Choices.

2. How Israel Forms a Government

Israel is a parliamentary democracy with a single chamber legislature, the Knesset. The president is the head of state, while executive authority rests with the government headed by the prime minister.

After an election, the official results are published and the president consults parliamentary representatives. The president then assigns a member of the Knesset the task of forming a government. The person selected is expected to have the strongest prospects of securing parliamentary confidence, not necessarily to be the leader of the party with the largest number of seats.

The presidential mandate

Under the government formation procedure described in the relevant Israeli legal framework, the designated candidate normally has 28 days to form a government. The president may grant an extension of up to 14 days. If the first candidate fails, another member of the Knesset may be given an opportunity under the applicable procedure.

President Isaac Herzog has called on party leaders to approach negotiations with an open mind and has expressed concern about another election. Reuters reported on 2 November that Herzog may encourage the formation of the broadest possible government, potentially including a unity arrangement between Netanyahu's camp and Eisenkot's opposition.

Why the president's decision matters

Herzog's choice will shape the opening stage of negotiations, but it will not determine the final outcome by itself. A candidate who receives the mandate still needs to assemble a government that can obtain the Knesset's confidence.

The president is therefore an important constitutional intermediary, not an independent political decision maker with the authority to impose a government on parliament.

Could negotiations fail?

Yes. If neither Netanyahu nor Eisenkot can assemble a viable majority, Israel could face a prolonged political stalemate and another election. The outgoing government would continue in a caretaker capacity until a successor is formed, subject to the relevant legal framework and constraints.

Israel has experienced repeated inconclusive elections in the past. The current deadlock is therefore not without precedent, although the combination of regional conflict, domestic polarisation and the question of Arab party participation makes this round particularly sensitive.

3. The Parties and Their Political Agendas

Israel's political competition cannot be understood as a simple contest between a pro war prime minister and a uniformly anti war opposition. The parties differ on security, relations with the Palestinians, judicial reform, religious authority, military service, economic priorities and the role of Arab citizens in national politics.

Likud: Netanyahu's national conservative movement

Likud is led by Benjamin Netanyahu and remains the largest individual party in the new Knesset. Its political tradition combines national conservatism, a strong emphasis on security and opposition to major territorial concessions that it considers dangerous to Israel's interests.

Netanyahu's supporters argue that his experience is necessary to manage the confrontation with Iran and other regional threats. They also point to military operations against Hamas and Hezbollah as evidence of a forceful security strategy.

Critics associate his leadership with the security failures surrounding the Hamas-led attacks of 7 October 2023, the prolonged war in Gaza, international isolation and deep internal divisions over judicial reform and the future of the Palestinian territories.

If Likud remains central to the next government, a major reversal of Israel's security doctrine is unlikely. The more immediate questions will concern the composition of the cabinet, the role of far right partners and the degree of flexibility available on Gaza and the West Bank.

Yashar: Gadi Eisenkot's centrist challenge

Yashar is led by Gadi Eisenkot, a former chief of staff of the Israel Defense Forces. His political appeal rests partly on his military background and his argument that Israel needs a more responsible and effective governing approach.

Eisenkot has focused on national security, public confidence, military service and the burden placed on reservists. His political challenge is to unite voters who oppose Netanyahu but disagree over judicial reform, religious authority, the role of Arab parties and the future of the Palestinian question.

A government led by Eisenkot could seek a different diplomatic style and a more coherent national security policy. It should not automatically be described as a government committed to Palestinian statehood. Such a commitment would need to appear in its coalition agreement and actual policy decisions.

Together: Naftali Bennett and Yair Lapid's political alliance

The Together alliance represents an important part of the opposition's attempt to bring different political constituencies into one electoral framework. Its leaders have previously occupied the centre and right of Israeli politics, and their appeal includes voters who want a change of leadership without necessarily endorsing a left wing political programme.

Its members may be willing to cooperate with Eisenkot on domestic governance, national service and institutional reform. However, differences over the Palestinian territories and the acceptable role of Arab parties could complicate coalition negotiations.

The Democrats: Yair Golan's more liberal opposition

The Democrats, led by Yair Golan, represent a more liberal and centre left current. The party has placed greater emphasis on democratic institutions, civil rights, public accountability and opposition to the far right.

It is likely to favour a different approach to the political and diplomatic management of the Palestinian issue than Netanyahu's governing partners. Nevertheless, the extent of any change would depend on the compromises required to maintain a coalition with centrist and right leaning parties.

Yisrael Beiteinu: Avigdor Lieberman's secular right

Avigdor Lieberman's Yisrael Beiteinu is a secular nationalist and right leaning party. Lieberman opposes Netanyahu's leadership but is also strongly opposed to cooperation with Arab-led parties in forming a government.

His position creates a serious obstacle for the opposition. A party can oppose Netanyahu and still refuse to support a government that depends on Arab parliamentary backing. This is one of the central contradictions in the post-election negotiations.

Ra'am: Mansour Abbas and pragmatic Arab participation

Ra'am, led by Mansour Abbas, represents an Islamist political movement operating within Israel's parliamentary system. It has previously demonstrated a willingness to support a governing coalition in return for attention to issues affecting Arab citizens, including public services, infrastructure, housing and municipal resources.

Its participation in the 2021 Bennett-Lapid coalition demonstrated that an Arab-led party could become part of a government supporting a broad range of Jewish and Arab political interests. That coalition eventually collapsed, but its formation changed the debate about the political role of Arab representatives.

Ra'am's potential role in the present negotiations is complicated by the war and the deep political divisions surrounding Hamas, Gaza and Israel's security policy.

The Joint List: A broader Arab parliamentary challenge

The Joint List represents a different political tradition within Arab Israeli politics. Its leaders have emphasised equality, civil rights, opposition to discrimination and Palestinian national rights.

Its willingness to support an opposition government would depend on the political commitments offered by Eisenkot and other parties. It is not safe to assume that the Joint List would accept a coalition agreement that excludes meaningful commitments on the treatment of Arab citizens or the Palestinian question.

Shas and United Torah Judaism: Ultra Orthodox influence

Shas and United Torah Judaism represent ultra Orthodox constituencies and have traditionally focused on religious education, public funding, family and religious affairs, military service exemptions and the status of religious institutions.

Their parliamentary support can be crucial in a closely divided Knesset. They may be prepared to negotiate over domestic religious and economic issues, but their positions on military service and public funding could create tension with secular opposition parties.

Otzma Yehudit and Religious Zionism: The far right

Otzma Yehudit, associated with Itamar Ben-Gvir, and Religious Zionism, associated with Bezalel Smotrich, represent the far right of Israeli politics. Their positions have included strong opposition to Palestinian statehood, support for an assertive security policy and demands for greater Israeli control over parts of the occupied West Bank.

These parties have exerted considerable influence on Netanyahu's previous coalition. If they return to government, they are likely to seek influence over policing, national security, settlement policy and the administration of the occupied territories.

A government that depends on them could face difficulty making concessions on Palestinian governance or territorial questions.

Comparing the political positions

Party or grouping	Political orientation	Major priorities and likely negotiating concerns
Likud	National conservative	Netanyahu's leadership, security policy, Iran and coalition survival.
Yashar	Centrist	National security, governance, public confidence and military service.
Together	Centre and right alliance	Leadership change, institutional governance and national unity.
The Democrats	Centre left	Democratic institutions, accountability and civil rights.
Yisrael Beiteinu	Secular right	National security, secular governance and opposition to Arab party partnership.
Ra'am	Arab Islamist parliamentary party	Arab community interests, civil rights, public services and political participation.
Joint List	Arab political alliance	Equality, Palestinian rights and opposition to discrimination.
Shas	Ultra Orthodox	Religious institutions, education, public funding and community interests.
United Torah Judaism	Ultra Orthodox	Religious education, military service arrangements and religious authority.
Otzma Yehudit	Far right	Hardline security policy and opposition to Palestinian statehood.
Religious Zionism	Far right religious nationalist	Settlement policy, Israeli control over territory and religious nationalist priorities.

These are broad political characterisations, not a substitute for individual party manifestos or coalition agreements. Parties can change negotiating positions when the formation of a government requires compromise.

4. Netanyahu's Political Survival Options

Netanyahu's immediate challenge is to turn his party's position as the largest parliamentary force into a viable government. His bloc has 53 seats, meaning he needs at least eight additional votes to reach the normal majority threshold.

His political survival depends on the willingness of other parties to cooperate, the possibility of attracting individual legislators and the ability of his opponents to maintain their own alliance.

Option 1: Retain the existing right wing partners

Netanyahu's first option is to keep the right wing and ultra Orthodox partners together. The difficulty is that this coalition remains short of a majority. It would need additional support from outside the existing bloc.

His partners may also demand stronger commitments on settlements, religious affairs, military service exemptions and security policy. Such demands could make it more difficult to attract moderate politicians.

Option 2: Attract defectors or individual members

Netanyahu could seek support from individual lawmakers or politicians who are dissatisfied with the opposition leadership. This would be politically difficult and could create instability because a government built on a small number of additional votes may struggle to pass budgets or maintain confidence.

Israeli politics has a history of coalition bargaining in which individual legislators can become important. However, a stable government requires more than a temporary parliamentary arrangement.

Option 3: Form a national unity government

A unity government involving Likud and some opposition parties could offer Netanyahu a route to remain prime minister while sharing authority with political rivals. It could be justified as a response to the regional security crisis and the need for stable national leadership.

Such an arrangement would require difficult compromises. Eisenkot and other opposition leaders have campaigned against Netanyahu, and some have ruled out serving under him. The opposition would also have to consider the political cost of joining a government associated with the previous Gaza war and the security failures of October 2023.

President Herzog may encourage a broad arrangement because another election could deepen the country's divisions. Reuters reported on 2 November that Herzog could explore a unity arrangement between Netanyahu's camp and Eisenkot's opposition.

Option 4: Remain in office as caretaker prime minister

If negotiations fail, Netanyahu's government may remain in office in a caretaker capacity until a new government is formed. This does not mean that he has won a fresh parliamentary mandate. It means that the outgoing government continues to perform its functions while the constitutional process remains unresolved.

A prolonged caretaker period could give Netanyahu time to rebuild his political position, negotiate with potential partners and wait for divisions within the opposition to become more pronounced.

Option 5: Face another election

If no candidate can form a government that secures parliamentary confidence, another election may become necessary. This could take place in early 2027 if the deadlock cannot be resolved.

Another election would create uncertainty for the economy, the military establishment and Israel's international partners. It could also allow Netanyahu to argue that the opposition has failed to produce a stable alternative.

5. Six Possible Coalition Arrangements

The following arrangements are political scenarios, not confirmed agreements. Their feasibility depends on the willingness of parties to compromise and the formal procedures for forming a government.

Scenario A: Netanyahu forms a broader right wing coalition

Netanyahu could attempt to retain his existing partners and attract additional support from politicians who share his security priorities. Such a government would likely maintain a hard line on Iran and preserve substantial continuity in its approach to Gaza and the West Bank.

The main problem is the shortage of parliamentary seats and the difficulty of attracting politicians who campaigned against Netanyahu.

Scenario B: Eisenkot forms a coalition with Arab party support

The opposition could combine its 48 seats with support from Ra'am and the Joint List. This could provide sufficient parliamentary numbers to replace Netanyahu.

However, there are two different forms of cooperation. Arab parties could formally join the government, with ministers and direct participation in cabinet decisions. Alternatively, they could provide external support on confidence votes and budgets without becoming full coalition partners.

The second option may be politically easier for some Jewish opposition parties, but it could leave Arab representatives with limited influence over the policies most important to their voters.

Scenario C: A minority government with outside support

An opposition government could potentially operate without a formal majority coalition if it receives sufficient support from outside the cabinet on critical votes. This arrangement would be politically fragile.

Every budget, major security decision and confidence vote could become a test of the government's survival. The arrangement would require a clear understanding between the parties about the limits of cooperation.

Scenario D: A unity government under Netanyahu

Some opposition parties might decide that the security situation makes a broad unity arrangement preferable to a prolonged political crisis. Netanyahu could remain prime minister, but opposition figures might demand control over key ministries, an agreed timetable for policy changes or a commitment to an inquiry into the failures of October 2023.

This would not necessarily mean that the opposition accepted Netanyahu's entire policy record. It would mean that the parties judged participation in government to be preferable to another election or an unstable parliamentary arrangement.

Scenario E: A unity government under Eisenkot

A different unity arrangement could involve Netanyahu's Likud supporting a government led by Eisenkot. This would be a dramatic political reversal and would require a major change in Likud's internal calculations.

It is less straightforward than a government led by the largest party, but parliamentary systems can produce unexpected arrangements when party leaders judge that their political interests require compromise.

Scenario F: No agreement and another election

If the political camps remain unwilling to compromise, the country could return to the electorate. A repeat election would not guarantee a different result. It could reproduce the same parliamentary deadlock or produce a more decisive majority for one side.

Scenario	Possible leader	Main obstacle	Likely policy direction
Broader right wing coalition	Netanyahu	Finding additional support	Substantial continuity in security and territorial policy
Opposition with Arab party support	Eisenkot	Opposition resistance to Arab partnership	Potentially different diplomatic tone, uncertain territorial change
Minority government	Eisenkot or another opposition figure	Dependence on outside votes	Limited room for major reforms
Unity government under Netanyahu	Netanyahu	Opposition refusal to serve under him	Security continuity with possible domestic compromises
Unity government under Eisenkot	Eisenkot	Likud's willingness to support a rival	Potential leadership and governance changes
Repeat election	Not determined	Failure to form a government	Continued uncertainty

6. Would a New Government Change Policy Towards Palestine?

This is the most important question for Palestinians and for the wider international community. The answer is that a change is possible, but a fundamental transformation is not guaranteed.

Israel's approach to the Palestinian question is shaped by more than the identity of the prime minister. It reflects the positions of coalition parties, the security establishment, public opinion, the military situation, settlement interests, relations with Washington and the broader regional environment.

A new government could change the tone of diplomacy and make different choices about Gaza's administration, humanitarian access, West Bank policy and international negotiations. But a government dominated by centrist and right leaning parties may still resist Palestinian statehood or maintain many existing security policies.

What could change relatively quickly?

• Diplomatic language: A new prime minister could use less confrontational language and seek to rebuild relations with Arab and European governments.
• Humanitarian access: The government could revise procedures affecting aid delivery, border crossings and international relief operations.
• Gaza governance: A new coalition could support a different arrangement for the administration and reconstruction of Gaza.
• West Bank enforcement: It could change priorities concerning settler violence, movement restrictions and enforcement against illegal activity.
• Political accountability: It could establish or support an independent inquiry into the security failures surrounding 7 October 2023.
• Negotiating channels: It could revive diplomatic discussions with Arab governments and international mediators.

What would be much harder to change?

The most difficult questions involve territory, settlements, Jerusalem, Palestinian refugees, security arrangements, recognition and sovereignty. These issues have remained unresolved across several Israeli governments.

A new government may be more willing to discuss a political process without accepting the final outcome sought by Palestinians. It could also support a temporary arrangement for Gaza while avoiding a commitment to a sovereign Palestinian state.

For Palestinians, the practical test will therefore be the government's decisions on the ground, not simply its public statements.

The two state solution

The two state solution envisages Israel and an independent Palestinian state existing alongside one another within mutually agreed and internationally recognised arrangements. It remains the central framework supported by much of the international diplomatic community.

The United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 80/195 on 15 December 2025, reaffirming the right of the Palestinian people to self determination, including the right to an independent State of Palestine. The resolution was adopted by 164 votes in favour, eight against and nine abstentions.

The vote demonstrates broad international support for Palestinian self determination. It does not, by itself, compel Israel's next government to accept a particular negotiating framework or implement a two state settlement.

The practical obstacles remain substantial: the status of Jerusalem, the borders of a future Palestinian state, Israeli settlements, security arrangements, Palestinian political representation, refugees and the question of mutual recognition.

A government led by Eisenkot could be more open to international diplomacy than Netanyahu's current coalition, but it would be premature to describe it as a government committed to Palestinian independence unless that commitment appears in its formal programme and decisions.

7. Gaza: The Most Difficult Test

Gaza will be one of the first major tests of any new Israeli government. The war has created an immense humanitarian and political challenge, while the future administration and security arrangements for the territory remain deeply contested.

Israel's previous government has resisted a return to the pre-war political arrangement and has placed considerable emphasis on preventing Hamas from exercising military and governing control. However, removing Hamas from power does not automatically produce a viable alternative administration.

Who would govern Gaza?

Any long term arrangement requires a decision about who administers civilian services, manages reconstruction, controls public security and represents the Palestinian population.

Possible models include a reformed Palestinian Authority, a technocratic Palestinian administration, an internationally supported transitional structure or another arrangement involving regional and international guarantees. Each has political and operational difficulties.

A Palestinian Authority role would require political legitimacy, administrative capacity and a workable relationship with Israel and international partners. A technocratic administration would need security protection and a credible source of authority. An international structure would require agreement among the principal parties and sufficient resources.

Humanitarian access and reconstruction

Reconstruction would require reliable access for food, medicine, fuel, building materials and essential services. It would also require financing, functioning institutions and a security environment in which reconstruction projects can proceed.

A new Israeli government could revise procedures and improve coordination with humanitarian agencies. However, meaningful improvement would depend on actual implementation, not announcements alone.

Would Eisenkot adopt a different Gaza policy?

A government led by Eisenkot could seek a more coordinated strategy involving the United States, Arab governments and international institutions. It might be more willing to explore a transitional administrative arrangement and a diplomatic framework for Gaza's future.

But Eisenkot's military background and emphasis on Israeli security mean that a new government would not necessarily accept a rapid withdrawal or a settlement that it believed left Israel exposed to renewed attacks.

The most plausible early change would be in the management of the diplomatic and administrative process. A fundamental change in the political status of Gaza would require agreement on the much harder questions of sovereignty, security and Palestinian representation.

8. The West Bank and Settlement Policy

The occupied West Bank is another major test of the next government. Israeli settlement expansion, violence, movement restrictions, demolitions and the weakening of Palestinian institutions have created an increasingly difficult political and security environment.

Far right parties have advocated policies that would increase Israeli control over the territory. Their influence in a Netanyahu led coalition could make major changes difficult.

Could a new government restrain settlement expansion?

A centrist government could reconsider certain approvals, enforcement practices and administrative decisions. It could also place greater emphasis on preventing settler violence and reducing tensions with Palestinian communities.

However, settlement policy is supported by influential political constituencies and has become embedded in Israeli domestic politics. Reversing it would require political determination and a government prepared to confront powerful interests.

Could annexation become a central issue?

Formal annexation of territory would carry major diplomatic and legal consequences. It could damage relations with Arab governments, create tensions with Washington and deepen Israel's international isolation.

A new government might avoid formal annexation while continuing policies that expand Israeli administrative or territorial control. For that reason, international observers will need to assess concrete decisions rather than relying only on whether the government uses the word annexation.

Security and Palestinian governance

Israeli governments frequently justify restrictions and military operations in the West Bank through security considerations. Palestinians and many international observers argue that these policies also entrench occupation and undermine the possibility of independent statehood.

A sustainable political arrangement would require addressing both Israeli security concerns and Palestinian rights. A policy that treats one side's security as the only relevant issue is unlikely to produce a durable settlement.

9. Can Israel Continue Military Operations Through a War Cabinet?

The question of whether Netanyahu can continue military operations through a war cabinet requires a distinction between political terminology and constitutional authority.

A war cabinet is generally a small group of senior political and security leaders responsible for coordinating decisions during a conflict. It is not automatically a separate constitutional government with unlimited authority.

What Israeli law says

Article 40 of Israel's Basic Law: The Government addresses the declaration of war and the initiation of significant military action. The provision states that the state may not start a war or initiate a significant military operation likely, with a probability close to certainty, to lead to war, except through a government decision.

The law also allows the government to delegate this authority to a ministerial committee established under the law. The committee may exercise the delegated authority only when the prime minister determines that the specific circumstances, including state security or foreign relations, require the committee to act instead of the full government.

This is a legal delegation mechanism. It does not mean that a prime minister can create a war cabinet and use it to bypass all constitutional requirements.

Can a caretaker government continue military operations?

The outgoing government remains in office until a successor is formed. A change in parliamentary arithmetic does not automatically remove its executive authority on election night.

However, the legal position depends on the nature of the military action, the status of the government, the applicable statutory provisions and any relevant court orders or other legal constraints.

It would be incorrect to claim that all military decisions are automatically prohibited during coalition negotiations. It would be equally incorrect to claim that a caretaker government has unlimited authority to make every possible decision without legal or political scrutiny.

Could Netanyahu use war to delay political accountability?

A security emergency can dominate political debate and make parties more reluctant to challenge the government during a conflict. It can also create pressure for a unity government and reduce the willingness of some politicians to withdraw support.

But war does not automatically extend a prime minister's tenure or remove the need for parliamentary confidence. Netanyahu cannot secure a governing majority merely by maintaining control of military decision making.

Political and military authority are related, but they are not identical. The prime minister's ability to remain in office depends on the parliamentary process, while decisions about significant military operations must follow the relevant legal framework.

Could a new government continue the war?

Yes. A new government could decide to continue military operations if it believed they were necessary for national security and if the relevant legal requirements were met. It could also pursue a ceasefire, negotiate different security arrangements or reduce military activity.

The identity of the prime minister matters, but the decisions of the government, the military command structure, coalition partners and the wider security environment matter as well.

International humanitarian law still applies

Domestic authorisation for military action does not determine whether every action during a conflict complies with international humanitarian law. The conduct of hostilities, protection of civilians, treatment of detainees and humanitarian access must be assessed under the relevant legal rules and on the evidence of each case.

Political approval for an operation does not automatically establish the legality of every action carried out during it.

10. What the Election Means for Iran

Iran is watching Israel's political transition closely, but it would be a mistake to assume that a Netanyahu defeat would automatically produce a softer Israeli policy towards Tehran.

Israel's concerns about Iran extend beyond the personality of its prime minister. They include Iran's nuclear programme, missile capabilities, regional alliances and support for armed groups that oppose Israel.

If Netanyahu remains prime minister

Netanyahu is likely to continue emphasising the Iranian threat and the need for a strong military posture. His political survival could depend partly on convincing right wing voters and coalition partners that he remains capable of protecting Israel's security.

However, his ability to pursue major military decisions could be affected by coalition negotiations, domestic opposition and the relationship with Washington.

If Eisenkot becomes prime minister

Eisenkot's military background does not mean that he would automatically adopt a conciliatory approach towards Iran. He could prefer a more disciplined strategy that combines deterrence, intelligence, international coordination and diplomatic pressure.

A new government might place greater emphasis on consultation with the United States and regional partners. But Israel's core concerns about Iran would remain.

Could a leadership change reduce the risk of war?

It could reduce the risk if the new government prioritised diplomatic coordination and avoided actions likely to trigger a wider confrontation. It could also reduce the risk if Washington and Tehran reached a broader understanding that lowered the incentive for military escalation.

But the opposite is also possible. A new prime minister could face pressure to demonstrate toughness and avoid appearing weak on security. In that situation, the policy could remain confrontational even if the diplomatic style changed.

The key question is whether the new government changes its operational decisions and negotiating position, not merely whether it replaces Netanyahu.

For wider context, see WorldAtNet's report, Israel Election 2026: Netanyahu, Iran and the Muslim World's Strategic Choices.

11. The Arab World and the Arab League

The Arab world has a major stake in the outcome of Israel's political transition. Gaza, the West Bank, Palestinian statehood, regional security and relations with Washington are all connected to the policies of the next Israeli government.

However, Arab governments do not have a single unified policy. Their priorities differ according to national security, domestic public opinion, economic interests, relations with the United States and the state of their diplomatic relationships with Israel.

What can the Arab League do?

The Arab League can coordinate diplomatic positions, issue collective statements, support humanitarian initiatives and encourage member governments to apply political pressure. It can also provide a regional forum for discussions about ceasefires, reconstruction and the future of Palestinian governance.

Its practical influence is limited by differences among member states and the absence of a single regional enforcement mechanism capable of compelling Israel or other governments to implement its decisions.

Arab League resolutions must also be distinguished from United Nations Security Council decisions. A League declaration can carry political weight, but it is not automatically a binding international legal order.

Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia has an interest in regional stability, economic diversification and maintaining its position as an important diplomatic actor. The future of relations with Israel remains connected to the Palestinian question and the conditions for any broader regional normalisation arrangement.

A new Israeli government that demonstrates meaningful progress on Palestinian rights and a political process could create diplomatic opportunities. A government that continues policies viewed as entrenching occupation could make normalisation more difficult.

Egypt and Jordan

Egypt and Jordan have long standing peace agreements with Israel and direct security interests in the Palestinian territories. Both countries have strong reasons to prevent displacement, regional escalation and a breakdown of arrangements that could destabilise their own borders.

They are likely to prioritise border security, humanitarian access, the future of Gaza and the preservation of regional stability.

Qatar and Türkiye

Qatar has played a significant role in mediation and humanitarian diplomacy. Türkiye has maintained a more openly critical position towards Israeli military policy and has sought to influence the regional diplomatic environment.

Both countries could become important actors in any future arrangement involving Gaza, although their roles would depend on the positions of Israel, the United States, Palestinian representatives and other Arab governments.

Pakistan

Pakistan does not recognise Israel and has consistently supported Palestinian self determination. Islamabad is likely to welcome any genuine movement towards a political settlement, but it will judge a new Israeli government by its actions rather than its political branding.

Pakistan can coordinate with Arab and Muslim majority countries through diplomatic channels and international forums. Its practical influence will depend on the willingness of regional partners to develop a common position.

12. The United States and International Pressure

The United States remains Israel's most important strategic partner. American military assistance, intelligence cooperation, diplomatic support and political influence give Washington substantial leverage.

But the relationship is not without tensions. Washington has to balance its commitment to Israeli security with the costs of regional escalation, the humanitarian consequences of the Gaza war, relations with Arab governments and domestic political opinion.

Would Washington prefer Netanyahu or Eisenkot?

American preferences may depend less on personal relationships than on the government's ability to maintain security cooperation and pursue regional diplomatic objectives.

Netanyahu has a long relationship with Republican and Democratic administrations, but his policies have also created disagreements with American leaders. Eisenkot could offer a different diplomatic style and a more predictable approach to coordination, but he would still have to address Israeli security concerns.

Could the United States pressure Israel on Palestine?

Washington could use diplomatic engagement, military assistance conditions, public statements and international negotiations to encourage policy changes. The degree of pressure would depend on the US administration's priorities and its willingness to accept political costs.

A new Israeli government could provide an opportunity for Washington to reset the relationship. Whether that opportunity produces meaningful changes would depend on the issues included in any bilateral understanding.

European governments and international institutions

European governments have increasingly faced pressure to respond to the humanitarian situation and the legal questions surrounding the occupied Palestinian territories. A new Israeli government could seek to repair relations, but that would require credible changes in policy and conduct.

International institutions will continue to assess issues such as humanitarian access, the law of occupation, settlement activity and the rights of Palestinians. These legal and diplomatic processes do not disappear when an election changes the government.

13. Netanyahu's Legal and Political Accountability

Netanyahu's political future is connected to his domestic legal proceedings and the public debate about the security failures surrounding 7 October 2023.

He has been on trial in Israel on corruption related charges, which he denies. The proceedings are separate from the political question of whether he can form a new government. An election result does not determine guilt or innocence, and a political agreement cannot automatically substitute for the judicial process.

The security inquiry

The Hamas-led attacks of 7 October 2023 exposed serious failures in Israel's intelligence, border security and political decision making. The question of who bears responsibility has become a major issue in Israeli public debate.

Opposition figures have argued that an independent state inquiry is necessary. If Netanyahu leaves office, pressure for an inquiry could become stronger, although its precise form and timing would depend on the new government's decisions and the applicable legal arrangements.

The International Criminal Court

The International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant for Netanyahu on 21 November 2024 in connection with alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity in the situation in Palestine. The warrant is a judicial measure based on allegations; it is not a conviction.

Netanyahu rejects the allegations. The legal process is separate from the Israeli election and would not automatically end if he lost office.

Could a political deal affect his legal position?

There has been public speculation about whether a broad political agreement could include a resolution of Netanyahu's legal difficulties. Reuters reported on 2 November that some political observers believe the issue could arise in unity government negotiations, but any such arrangement would face legal, political and public scrutiny.

It would be inaccurate to describe a pardon or negotiated resolution as agreed or inevitable. The president's constitutional role, the independence of the judicial process and the political acceptability of any proposal would all matter.

14. Six Possible Political Scenarios

The following scenarios are conditional assessments based on the parliamentary arithmetic and positions reported by 2 November 2026. They are not predictions or confirmed agreements.

Scenario 1: Netanyahu returns through a broader coalition

Netanyahu may succeed in attracting additional support from right leaning or religious parties, or from individual lawmakers who prefer continuity over an opposition government reliant on Arab party support.

This would preserve much of the existing security approach. It could also increase the influence of far right coalition partners if their votes become essential to the government's survival.

Implications for Palestine: Major changes in settlement policy, Gaza governance or recognition of Palestinian statehood would be unlikely without a substantial shift in coalition composition.

Scenario 2: Eisenkot forms a government with Arab party support

This is the clearest numerical route to replacing Netanyahu. Eisenkot's 48 seat opposition grouping could seek the support of Ra'am and the Joint List, whose combined 19 seats could provide a parliamentary majority.

The difficulty is political legitimacy within the Jewish opposition. Some parties have ruled out formal cooperation with Arab-led parties, while others argue that Arab citizens must have equal political rights and that their elected representatives should be treated as legitimate parliamentary partners.

Implications for Palestine: A government might adopt a different diplomatic tone and consider changes in Gaza and the West Bank. But the coalition could still avoid a commitment to Palestinian statehood if that would cause its centrist and right leaning partners to withdraw.

Scenario 3: A minority government supported from outside

An opposition government could attempt to govern without formally including Arab parties in the cabinet, relying on their support for confidence votes and budgets.

This arrangement could be easier for some opposition politicians to defend domestically. However, it would make the government vulnerable to political disagreements and could limit Arab parties' ability to influence policy.

Implications for Palestine: Some changes in humanitarian policy or diplomatic engagement might be possible, but a fragile government would have limited political room for a major territorial settlement.

Scenario 4: A unity government under Netanyahu

President Herzog may encourage a broad national unity arrangement. If Eisenkot or other opposition figures agree to join a government led by Netanyahu, the country could avoid another election and create a wider parliamentary base.

Such an agreement could include a rotation arrangement, ministerial changes, an inquiry into the October 2023 security failures or limits on the influence of far right partners. These are possibilities, not established negotiating terms.

Implications for Palestine: A unity government could moderate some policies if the opposition secured real influence. But if Netanyahu retained control over the central security and territorial agenda, continuity would remain likely.

Scenario 5: A unity government under Eisenkot

Netanyahu's opponents could attempt to persuade parts of Likud or other right leaning parties to support an Eisenkot led administration. This would require a major political realignment and could trigger internal conflict within Likud.

Implications for Palestine: The change of leadership could create an opportunity for different diplomatic arrangements, but the policies of the coalition partners would still determine how far change could go.

Scenario 6: Negotiations fail and Israel returns to the polls

If no candidate can form a government, another election could become necessary. Netanyahu would remain in office in a caretaker capacity while the political system attempts to resolve the deadlock.

Implications for Palestine: Political uncertainty could delay decisions about Gaza's future, settlement policy and diplomatic negotiations. Military and security institutions would continue operating under the applicable legal framework, but strategic decisions could become politically more difficult.

Scenario	Political outcome	Prospects for Palestinian policy change
Netanyahu returns with broader coalition	Continuity of leadership	Limited change likely
Eisenkot with Arab party support	New opposition led government	Potential change in diplomacy and selected policies; statehood remains uncertain
Minority government	Fragile parliamentary arrangement	Limited and vulnerable changes
Unity government under Netanyahu	Broader coalition with Netanyahu at the top	Some moderation possible, depending on opposition influence
Unity government under Eisenkot	Leadership change with right leaning support	Potential diplomatic reset, but coalition constraints remain
Repeat election	Continued political deadlock	Major policy decisions may be delayed

15. What to Watch Next

The coming days and weeks will be more important than election night itself. The following developments will indicate whether Israel is moving towards a new political direction or simply entering another period of coalition bargaining.

1. Certified election results: The Central Elections Committee's formal publication of the results, scheduled for 4 November.
2. President Herzog's consultations: Which candidate receives the first opportunity to form a government and what support the parties declare.
3. Coalition agreements: Whether the parties agree on Gaza, the West Bank, military service, judicial reform and the role of Arab representatives.
4. Arab party negotiations: Whether Ra'am and the Joint List are offered formal participation, outside support or excluded from the process.
5. Lieberman's position: Whether Yisrael Beiteinu maintains its refusal to cooperate with Arab-led parties.
6. Likud's internal debate: Whether Netanyahu retains full control of his party or faces pressure to compromise or step aside.
7. New Knesset session: The expected convening of parliament on 10 November and the election of its leadership.
8. Military decisions: Whether the outgoing or new government changes the operational approach to Gaza, Iran or the West Bank.
9. US diplomacy: Whether Washington encourages a unity government or presses a new administration to change policy.
10. Humanitarian conditions: Whether aid access and reconstruction arrangements in Gaza improve in practice.

16. Key Takeaways

• Netanyahu's bloc lost its parliamentary majority, but the prime minister remains in office while coalition negotiations continue.
• The reported distribution is 53 seats for Netanyahu's bloc, 48 for the main opposition and 19 for Arab-led parties.
• Neither principal bloc has the 61 seats needed to govern independently.
• Arab parties have become potentially decisive, but some Jewish opposition parties reject formal cooperation with them.
• A new government could change diplomatic tone and selected policies, but it would not automatically end military operations or accept Palestinian statehood.
• Gaza's future administration, humanitarian access and reconstruction will be major tests for any incoming government.
• Settlement policy and Israeli control in the West Bank are likely to remain among the most difficult issues.
• Israeli law requires government authorisation for war and significant military action, while allowing a legally defined delegation to a ministerial committee. A war cabinet is not an independent route around parliamentary government.
• Iran's policy towards Israel will depend on actual security and diplomatic decisions, not merely the identity of the prime minister.
• The Arab League can coordinate diplomacy and apply political pressure, but it cannot independently impose a settlement.
• The most meaningful test of political change will be the new government's decisions and the conditions experienced by Israelis and Palestinians.

17. Conclusion: A Change of Government Is Not Yet a Change of History

Israel's October 2026 election has weakened Benjamin Netanyahu's parliamentary position, but it has not settled the country's political future. The prime minister's bloc remains the largest parliamentary grouping, while the opposition has a numerical opportunity to replace him but lacks agreement on how to use it.

The 19 seats won by Arab-led parties have become central to the political equation. Their participation could allow the opposition to form a government, but the refusal of some Jewish opposition parties to cooperate with them makes that outcome uncertain. Israel is therefore facing a test not only of coalition arithmetic, but also of the political legitimacy granted to Arab citizens and their elected representatives.

For Palestinians, the election offers an opportunity for a different political approach, but not a guarantee of meaningful change. A new government could improve humanitarian access, reconsider aspects of the Gaza strategy, restrain certain settlement policies and revive diplomatic engagement. Yet a centrist government may still reject a fully sovereign Palestinian state or preserve much of Israel's existing security doctrine.

The future of Gaza will be particularly revealing. If a new administration supports a credible Palestinian civilian governing arrangement, reconstruction and sustained humanitarian access, it could represent a significant policy shift. If it continues to rely on military control without a viable political settlement, the underlying conflict will remain unresolved.

Netanyahu's political survival also depends on the wider security environment. A regional crisis can encourage national unity and make opposition parties reluctant to challenge the government. But military operations do not automatically suspend parliamentary accountability or extend a prime minister's mandate. The legal authority to conduct military operations and the political authority to govern remain distinct questions.

The Arab world, the United States and European governments will watch the new coalition closely. Their response will depend on whether Israel changes policies in practice, not simply whether it changes its prime minister. International support for Palestinian self determination remains substantial, but converting that support into a political settlement requires decisions by the parties directly involved.

The central conclusion is therefore clear: Netanyahu's electoral setback has opened a political window, but the outcome remains uncertain. A new prime minister could change the tone and direction of Israeli policy. Whether that becomes a genuine turning point for Palestinians will depend on the coalition's composition, its willingness to confront entrenched interests and its readiness to translate diplomatic language into concrete political decisions.

18. Frequently Asked Questions

1. Did Benjamin Netanyahu lose the 2026 Israeli election?

Netanyahu's bloc lost its parliamentary majority, but he was not immediately removed from office. The reported results gave his bloc 53 seats, the main opposition 48 and Arab-led parties 19. He remains prime minister while the process of forming a new government continues.

2. Who won the most seats?

Likud, led by Benjamin Netanyahu, was the largest individual party with 27 seats. However, the broader bloc supporting Netanyahu secured only 53 seats, below the 61 needed for a majority.

3. Can Gadi Eisenkot become prime minister?

Yes. Eisenkot could become prime minister if he is able to assemble a government that secures parliamentary confidence. His most obvious numerical route involves support from Arab-led parties, although some potential coalition partners oppose that arrangement.

4. Will Netanyahu's departure end the war in Gaza?

No automatic end would follow. A new government could change military policy, negotiate a ceasefire or support a different Gaza administration. It could also continue military operations. The outcome depends on the new government's decisions and the wider security and diplomatic situation.

5. Would an Eisenkot government recognise a Palestinian state?

That cannot be assumed. The opposition is politically diverse, and a change of prime minister does not automatically create a commitment to Palestinian statehood. The coalition agreement and actual government decisions would provide the clearest evidence.

6. Can Netanyahu continue military operations through a war cabinet?

Israeli law places authority over war and significant military action with the government, while allowing the government to delegate defined powers to a ministerial committee under specified conditions. A war cabinet cannot independently extend Netanyahu's tenure or bypass the parliamentary process.

7. What is the role of the Arab League?

The Arab League can coordinate diplomatic positions, support humanitarian initiatives and apply political pressure. Its resolutions are not automatically binding on Israel and should not be confused with decisions of the United Nations Security Council.

8. Could Israel hold another election?

Yes. If political negotiations fail and no candidate can form a government, another election could become necessary. Until a successor government is formed, the outgoing administration remains in office under the relevant caretaker arrangements.

19. Five Related Articles Already Published on WorldAtNet

For additional background on the Israeli election, Iran, Palestinian policy and the changing Middle East, explore these previously published WorldAtNet reports:

1. Israel Election 2026: Netanyahu's Political Future, the War Cabinet, Palestine and the Arab World's Choices — WorldAtNet's earlier analysis of the election, coalition arithmetic and Palestinian policy questions.
2. Israel Election 2026: Netanyahu, Iran and the Muslim World's Strategic Choices — the election's implications for Iran and Muslim majority countries.
3. The Abraham Accords: Remaking the Middle East — the changing relationship between Israel and Arab states and the future of regional normalisation.
4. The Middle East at the Brink: Iran, Israel and the Regional Crisis — the military and diplomatic dynamics shaping the wider confrontation.
5. Bombs Before the Ink Dried — the relationship between US-Iran diplomacy, military escalation and the fragile regional security environment.

🌍 Browse All World Affairs News →

20. Sources and Further Reading

The following sources support the election results, government formation process, legal framework, Palestinian policy analysis and international context.

1. Associated Press: Difficult negotiations lie ahead in Israel after Netanyahu's bloc lost its parliamentary majority — reported election results, Arab party representation, coalition obstacles and the next parliamentary steps. Note: Use the AP article's canonical page if the URL redirects.
2. Congressional Research Service: Israel, 2026 Elections and Government Formation — election arithmetic, coalition scenarios and the government formation timetable.
3. Reuters: Isaac Herzog, the middleman in Israel's political brawl — President Herzog's role and possible unity government negotiations, 2 November 2026.
4. Al Jazeera: Israel election, when will a government be formed and who will lead it? — the presidential process and coalition possibilities, 1 November 2026.
5. Al Jazeera: If Netanyahu goes, does anything really change for Palestinians? — analysis of the limits of potential policy change towards Gaza and the West Bank.
6. Israel Central Elections Committee: Official election timetable — election date and scheduled publication of results.
7. Knesset: Basic Law, The Government — Article 40 and the legal authority for war and significant military action.
8. Knesset: Amendment concerning authority to wage war — explanation of the 2018 amendment to the Basic Law.
9. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 80/195 — the right of the Palestinian people to self determination, adopted 15 December 2025.
10. International Criminal Court: Situation in the State of Palestine — official legal materials concerning the ICC proceedings. Consult the Court's current case record for subsequent developments.

Editorial note: This article reflects information available through 2 November 2026. The reported 53, 48 and 19 seat distribution is based on reporting of the final results, while formal publication by the Central Elections Committee is scheduled for 4 November. Coalition arrangements remain unresolved. Political scenarios are conditional analysis, not confirmed agreements. Allegations, investigations and criminal proceedings should not be treated as convictions.

WorldAtNet — Global Perspective for a Changing World.