From Rejection to Recognition: How Global Politics Are Redefining the Israel–Palestine Conflict

Introduction

The Middle East conflict — especially the Israeli-Palestinian dimension — has always had a heavy diplomatic and symbolic component, not just a military one. Recognition (or non-recognition) of states is a key tool in international relations: it confers legitimacy, opens up possibilities for treaties and aid, affects domestic and international standing. In recent years there has been a wave of countries more actively recognising the State of Palestine, or moving to do so, often framing it as a way to pressure Israel to change its policies, revive hopes for a two-state solution, and respond to humanitarian crises. On the flip side, Israel remains sensitive to such recognitions, seeing some as hostile or pre-emptive moves outside of bilateral negotiation. Understanding this transition requires looking at both long-term historical trends and more immediate catalysts.

Historical Background

1. Origins of Recognition Debate (1940s-1970s):

   • With the UN Partition Plan of 1947, Israel was founded in 1948, and many states recognized it early. However, many Arab and Muslim majority states opposed recognition, largely due to the displacement of Palestinians, the outcomes of wars (e.g. 1948 Arab-Israeli War, 1967 war), and solidarity with Palestinians.
   • For decades, many Arab League and OIC (Organisation of Islamic Cooperation) countries refused to recognize Israel or had very limited relations. Other countries, in contrast, recognized Israel soon after its founding.

2. Normalisation and the Abraham Accords (2020):

   • A shift began to occur with formal diplomatic normalizations between Israel and some Arab states. The Abraham Accords (2020) were especially significant: UAE and Bahrain recognised and formalised relations; Sudan and Morocco followed (or agreed to follow) normalization too.
   • These agreements were motivated by several factors including economic interests, security concerns (notably shared concerns about Iran), strategic diplomacy with the U.S., and a recognition that continued conflict was costly.

3. Recognition of Palestine:

   • In parallel, recognition of Palestine as a state has also been growing since the 1980s, especially after the 1988 Palestinian Declaration of Independence by the PLO. Many countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America recognized Palestine early.
   • In more recent years, especially since Israel's military operations in Gaza starting October 2023, there has been renewed urgency and international pressure, leading to more countries formally recognising Palestine.

Why the Recent Transition / Wave Occurred

Several intertwined causes account for the recent intensification of diplomatic recognition (mostly of Palestine, but part of a broader shift in how countries engage with Israel/Palestine):

1. Humanitarian Crisis & Public Opinion:

   • The war in Gaza (from October 2023 onward) has generated very large numbers of civilian casualties, widespread destruction, displacement, and suffering. Such crises often shift global public opinion, galvanise NGOs, media scrutiny, and put pressure on governments to respond.
   • Domestic political calculations: leaders in democracies or semi-democracies respond both to moral outrage and to public pressure. Recognizing Palestine becomes a way to show alignment with voices condemning humanitarian impact.

2. Erosion of Confidence in Negotiated Solution:

   • Many observers believe that peace negotiations over many years have repeatedly stalled, with settlement expansion, military operations, and lack of progress making bilateral solutions feel increasingly unlikely. Recognition becomes a tool to break deadlocks, to change diplomatic leverage.

3. Changes in Global Power Relations & Strategic Alignments:

   • Some countries view recognition as part of aligning with international norms (human rights, international law) or with blocs that place more weight on such norms.
   • Additionally, changing geopolitical concerns (e.g. about Iran, about energy, about alliances) mean that some Arab or Muslim majority states or others see benefit in normalising relations (or recognising Palestine) without entirely rejecting Israel’s existence. The Abraham Accords showed that states can shift their calculus.

4. Diplomatic Symbolism & International Institutions:

   • Being in compliance with international law, UN resolutions, human rights discourse: recognition aids in making claims in global fora, potentially sanctions or international legal action, more legitimacy for Palestinian representatives.
   • Symbolic steps can have cumulative effects: as more leading democracies (or those seen as norm-setters) recognise Palestine, it emboldens others.

Does it Mean Accepting Israel’s Power / Strength?

• In some sense yes: the recognition of Palestine by many countries doesn’t deny Israel’s existence; rather, it often recognizes the Palestinian right to statehood. For many, it’s not about undermining Israel’s sovereignty but about balancing the narrative: pressing for Israeli responsibility and accountability.
• The Abraham Accords and other normalisations show that many Arab states are increasingly willing to engage with Israel openly, not just under covert or limited terms. This is a tacit acknowledgement of the regional role Israel plays economically, militarily, technologically.
• At the same time, there remains resistance in many countries (especially among public opinion, certain political or religious groups) to full normalisation without significant concessions: e.g. over settlements, the status of Jerusalem, Palestinian refugees, the West Bank, Gaza, etc.

Will This Bring Peace in the Arab World / Middle East?

There is potential, but also many obstacles. Some possibilities and risks:

Potential positive outcomes:

• Increased diplomatic pressure for a two-state solution: As more countries recognise Palestine, Israel faces more international scrutiny. This could push Israel to negotiate more seriously, reduce settlement expansion, address humanitarian issues, or enter into mediated agreements.
• Legitimacy for Palestinian leadership: Formal recognition boosts the status and moral authority of Palestinian representatives in international forums, possibly enabling more leverage.
• New diplomatic channels & normalisation: Countries that previously had hostile or no formal relations may develop more communication, trade, economic ties which can help reduce tensions and create incentives for peace. The example of the Abraham Accords shows how normalisation can open up opportunities in commerce, tourism, security cooperation.
• Breaking the diplomatic isolation of certain actors: Some Arab or Muslim-majority states may find themselves able to engage more openly with Israel, which could shift regional alliances and reduce proxy conflicts.

Risks and obstacles:

• Lack of on-ground change: Recognition is symbolic; unless followed by concrete changes (ceasefires, withdrawal, border agreements, humanitarian relief, legal and claims resolutions), it may not satisfy affected populations or reduce violence.
• Israeli opposition: Governments in Israel may resist recognitions they see as undermining negotiations, or as supporting Palestinian claims in ways Israel finds threatening, both territorially and politically.
• Internal divisions among Palestinians: Differences between leaderships (e.g. between Palestinian Authority and Hamas), or between those willing to negotiate and those less so, could undermine coherence in using the diplomatic leverage.
• Geopolitical backlash: Recognitions may provoke responses from powerful allies (e.g. USA, or Israel’s backers), which could complicate diplomatic or aid relationships. Also, states may face internal political risk from populations less supportive of recognition.
• Symbolic without binding commitments: Unless these recognitions are coupled with treaties, assurances, conflict resolution mechanisms, they may be seen as moral posturing rather than effective policy shifts.

Future Outlook

1. Continuation of the Recognition Wave:

   • It is likely that more countries will recognise Palestine, especially in Europe, Latin America, Africa. Many have already conditioning their recognition on certain preconditions (e.g. release of hostages, Hamas out of power) but are moving ahead.
   • This trend may be accelerated by future conflicts or humanitarian crises, which shift international attention and public opinion.

2. Potential Negotiated Peace or Partial Agreements:

   • There is possibility for renewed peace talks, possibly with international mediation, in which recognitions play a role in shaping negotiating leverage.
   • Partial agreements over borders, security, and governance (West Bank/Gaza) may be more likely than a full comprehensive peace in near term, unless there is significant shift in political leadership on either side.

3. Changing Arab World Dynamics:

   • Some Arab states will continue to balance their relations: maintaining ties with global powers, Israel, and also responding to domestic sentiment, religious solidarity with Palestinians.
   • There may be increasing economic cooperation between Israel and Arab states (as seen in trade, tech, water, energy) even without formal peace deals, as mutual interests rise.

4. Role of International Law, UN, Courts, and NGOs:

   • As recognition grows, Palestinian claims in international legal frameworks may get stronger: e.g. jurisdiction in international courts, claims related to human rights, settlement legality, etc.
   • Also, international bodies may take stronger positions or create resolutions that press Israel more, potentially increasing diplomatic cost of failing to address Palestinian concerns.

Here is a country-by-country (or regionally focused) breakdown of how recognition is shifting (or resisting) in states like Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and some others in the Arab / Muslim world — what their positions are, what constraints they face, and what the implications may be:

Pakistan

• Current Position & History
  Pakistan does not recognize the State of Israel and has maintained this policy firmly for decades.
  After the 1988 Palestine Declaration of Independence, Pakistan recognized the Palestinian Authority and established full diplomatic relations with it in 1989.
  Pakistan often frames its foreign policy in Muslim / Islamic solidarity terms, and supporting Palestine has been a consistent component of its regional / global identity.

• Recent Diplomatic Moves & Rhetoric
  In recent international forums (e.g. at a UN summit), Pakistan has reaffirmed its “historic solidarity” with the Palestinian people, called for “universal recognition” of Palestine, and pushed for full UN membership for Palestine.
  Pakistan’s Foreign Office has explicitly stated that “recognition of Israel is not under consideration,” unless there is a “just settlement” acceptable to Palestinians.
  Pakistan also welcomed recent recognitions of Palestine by countries like UK, Canada, Australia, and urged others to follow.

• Constraints, Calculations & Risks

  1. Domestic / Public Opinion: Much of Pakistani public discourse (political, media, religious) is strongly pro-Palestinian; any move toward recognizing Israel risks domestic backlash.
  2. Regional / Islamic Solidarity: Pakistan sees itself as a stakeholder in the Muslim world; abandoning the non-recognition stance could reduce its moral leadership among Muslim states.
  3. Relations with Israel’s Allies: Recognizing Israel unilaterally might strain Pakistan’s relations with states that are strongly pro-Israel (or allied with Israel).
  4. Conditional Approach: Pakistan’s policy frames recognition as conditional on just resolution for Palestinians — so it reserves flexibility but holds firm until Palestinians’ rights are addressed.

• Implications
  Pakistan’s refusal to recognize Israel strengthens its credentials as a defender of Palestinian rights in the Muslim world. But it also means Pakistan is not participating in possible new diplomatic alignments or normalisations that some other states might explore (i.e. Israel ↔ some Arab states).
  If Israel and the Palestinians reach a credible peace deal (with recognized states, borders, guarantees, etc.), then Pakistan might re-evaluate; but until then its refusal remains a symbolic and strategic marker.

Saudi Arabia

• Current Position & Policy Statements
  Saudi Arabia does not currently recognize Israel.
  Saudi leadership has stated that any normalization with Israel is conditional on the creation of a viable Palestinian state, with East Jerusalem (al-Quds) as its capital.
  At recent UN / international summits, Saudi Arabia has renewed calls for global recognition of Palestine and has strongly criticised Israeli actions in Gaza and the West Bank.

• Strategic Space, Calculations & Leverage

  1. Leadership in the Arab / Muslim World: Saudi Arabia holds influence in the Gulf, Arab League, OIC — its stance sets norms for many states.
  2. Balancing U.S. / Western Allies & Regional Security: Saudi Arabia is a close U.S. ally; normalisation with Israel would appeal to some Western strategic interests (shared concerns about Iran). But Riyadh’s conditional approach gives it bargaining power.
  3. Domestic / Regional Legitimacy: Saudi leaders cannot appear to betray the Palestinian cause domestically or among Muslim publics; doing so without acceptable outcomes would risk legitimacy.
  4. Gradual / Conditional Normalisation: Saudi Arabia seems to prefer incremental steps (security cooperation, indirect engagement) tied to progress on the Palestinian issue, rather than immediate full diplomatic recognition. Some reports indicate they have held back from full normalisation amid the Gaza war.

• Implications
  If Saudi Arabia eventually normalizes with Israel (once conditions are met), it could act as a “bridge” influencer: bringing other Gulf / Arab states closer, helping mediate in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, or pushing Israel to accept tougher concessions.
  On the other hand, if recognition is too contingent or delayed, it risks being seen as symbolic without substance — which might not satisfy those pushing for stronger support for Palestine.

Other Notable States / Trends in the Arab / Muslim World

• Egypt & Jordan:
  Egypt recognized Israel in 1979 (Camp David Accords) and Jordan in 1994. These remain exceptions in the Arab world, though their relations have seen strains and conditionality (especially over issues like Gaza, settlements, Palestinian refugees).

• UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, Sudan:
  These states normalized relations with Israel in 2020 under the Abraham Accords (or parallel arrangements).
  Their steps show a model of pragmatism: combining strategic, economic, security interests with conditional political messaging.
  However, public opinion in some of these countries remains skeptical or critical of full normalisation — and governments must manage that tension.

• Gulf States & Smaller Arab States (Oman, Qatar, etc.):
  Some states maintain limited, pragmatic contacts (e.g. diplomatic back channels, mediation roles) with Israel, though no full recognition. This allows them flexibility: maintaining public solidarity with Palestinians while engaging diplomatically behind the scenes.

• Muslim-majority non-Arab states (e.g. Malaysia, Indonesia, Turkey, Pakistan)
  Many of these continue to withhold recognition of Israel (or maintain minimal relations), often citing solidarity with Palestinians, historical narratives, or domestic political pressures.
  Some may explore conditional or limited engagement in future, but full recognition is politically sensitive.

Comparative Insights & Forecast

1. Conditional Recognition Pathway
   Many states are not outright rejecting recognition forever; rather they place preconditions (Palestinian statehood, rights, East Jerusalem, return of refugees, security guarantees). This creates a pathway where recognition becomes a tool of negotiation rather than an immediate objective.

2. Diplomatic Realignment & Regional Influence
   If leading states (Saudi Arabia, for instance) shift toward recognition or more open engagement, it could create cascading effects: smaller states might follow, alliances may reconfigure (e.g. blocs aligning around Israel/Palestine or balancing against him).

3. Leverage in Peace Negotiations
   Countries that currently withhold recognition have diplomatic leverage: they can use it as a bargaining chip in peace negotiations, aid and investment packages, or in mediating roles.

4. Public Opinion & Legitimacy Constraints
   All states face limits from public sentiment, media, religious organizations, and internal politics. A state might want to normalise, but cannot do so in a way that seems to ‘betray’ the Palestinian cause to its own populace.

5. Risk of Symbolic Recognition without Substance
   Recognitions that are not backed by concrete actions (e.g. diplomatic presence, treaties, economic ties, security arrangements) risk being dismissed as symbolic or superficial. Critics often warn that recognition should be matched by measures (sanctions, embargos, diplomatic pressure) or else it will not produce real change.

6. Potential for Incremental or Phased Moves
   Some states may start with partial agreements (e.g. diplomatic liaison offices, consulates, trade pacts) before full embassies or full recognition. This stepwise approach lets them test public reaction and maintain flexibility.

7. Geopolitical Overlays (U.S., China, Iran, Russia)
   The major powers will influence these moves. The U.S. has historically been a strong backer of Israel; changes in U.S. policy (or pressure) will matter. Similarly, China, Russia, Iran, and other regional actors will engage — either pushing states toward or away from recognition depending on their interests.

Conclusion

The recent wave of recognition—especially of Palestine by many countries—is not simply symbolic: it reflects a turning point in global diplomacy where moral outrage, humanitarian crisis, and frustration with stalled peace processes are pushing states to shift policy. While this does in some ways accept that Israel is a regional power whose actions are under global scrutiny, it’s more about asserting the rights of Palestinians and rebalancing diplomatic leverage.

Whether these recognitions will bring peace in the Arab world, or to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, depends heavily on what comes after: whether governments use this shift to push for serious negotiation, whether on-ground conditions improve, whether political will exists on all sides, and whether international actors maintain pressure not just through statements but through actions (aid, sanctions, mediation). The transition offers a chance — maybe a narrow window — for re-energising peace efforts, but the obstacles remain large, and success is not guaranteed.