Tensions between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have quietly intensified over the past several years, even as both countries continue to align with the United States on core strategic interests and regional security priorities. For much of the last decade, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi were viewed as near-inseparable partners in the Gulf, coordinating closely on military operations, intelligence sharing, energy policy, and diplomatic positioning. Their partnership appeared solid, reinforced by shared concerns about Iran’s regional influence, extremist movements, and the need to modernize oil-dependent economies. Yet beneath this outward unity, differences in ambition, pace, and political calculation were steadily accumulating.
The divergence became more visible after the UAE moved decisively to normalize relations with Israel through the Abraham Accords in 2020. Abu Dhabi framed the decision as pragmatic diplomacy, aimed at opening economic corridors, accessing Israeli technology, boosting tourism, and reinforcing its image as a forward-looking global hub. The move was also designed to deepen ties with Washington by demonstrating diplomatic initiative and regional leadership. Background on the accords and their strategic intent can be found at https://www.state.gov/the-abraham-accords/.
Saudi Arabia, while supportive of regional de-escalation and quietly cooperative on certain security matters, adopted a far more cautious approach. Riyadh has consistently emphasized that any formal normalization with Israel must be tied to meaningful progress toward Palestinian statehood. This position reflects not only Saudi domestic public opinion but also the kingdom’s unique role as custodian of Islam’s two holiest sites and its long-standing claim to leadership in the Muslim world. The difference between the Saudi and Emirati approaches was therefore not ideological but structural, rooted in differing political responsibilities and legitimacy calculations.
For years, these differences remained manageable because shared security interests outweighed emerging competition. Saudi Arabia and the UAE coordinated extensively on counterterrorism, supported U.S. strategic objectives, and presented a largely united front on major regional issues. Their cooperation made the later tension appear sudden, even shocking to outside observers. In reality, the shift was gradual, driven by parallel ambitions rather than a single rupture.
As both states launched ambitious economic transformation plans, competition became unavoidable. Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 and the UAE’s long-standing diversification strategy increasingly overlapped in areas such as logistics, tourism, finance, renewable energy, and technology. Each sought to attract multinational companies, global talent, and foreign capital. What began as healthy competition gradually extended into foreign policy, as economic influence and geopolitical leverage became more tightly linked.
Yemen emerged as the most consequential arena where these diverging strategies collided. Saudi Arabia entered the Yemeni conflict in 2015 with the aim of restoring a unified government, preventing hostile forces from controlling its southern border, and maintaining Yemen as a stable neighbor rather than a fragmented security risk. For Riyadh, Yemen’s unity is inseparable from Saudi national security, particularly given the kingdom’s long border and vulnerability to cross-border attacks.
The UAE initially joined the Saudi-led coalition, sharing concerns about instability and extremism. Over time, however, Abu Dhabi refined its objectives. The UAE focused increasingly on counterterrorism, maritime security, and partnerships with local actors in southern Yemen. It invested heavily in training and supporting forces that could secure ports, coastal areas, and key shipping lanes. From the Emirati perspective, control over maritime routes near the Bab al-Mandab Strait was essential to protecting global trade and preventing extremist networks from exploiting ungoverned spaces.
These approaches were not inherently incompatible, but coordination weakened as priorities diverged. Saudi officials grew increasingly uneasy about the empowerment of southern factions they believed could permanently fracture Yemen. The UAE, for its part, viewed Saudi insistence on centralized authority as unrealistic given Yemen’s complex social and political landscape. Diplomatic channels struggled to reconcile these views, and mistrust deepened quietly.
The situation escalated when Saudi Arabia accused the UAE of indirectly supporting armed groups whose actions threatened Saudi security interests. Public accusations followed, accompanied by military and diplomatic signaling that exposed the depth of disagreement. The UAE’s subsequent decision to withdraw its remaining forces from Yemen confirmed that the partnership had entered a more fragile phase. While not an outright rupture, the episode underscored how far cooperation had eroded.
This breakdown did not occur in isolation. It followed years of quieter rivalry over regional leadership, economic influence, and diplomatic reach. Saudi Arabia and the UAE increasingly found themselves competing for investment, logistics dominance, and strategic partnerships across Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. Both sought to shape outcomes in conflict zones such as Libya and Sudan, sometimes backing different factions despite shared rhetoric about stability.
Despite these tensions, it would be misleading to frame the relationship as one of hostility. Saudi Arabia and the UAE remain deeply interconnected through trade, finance, defense cooperation, and personal ties among ruling elites. Their disagreement is sharper than past differences, but it is not irreversible. Gulf politics has historically oscillated between rivalry and reconciliation, often driven by pragmatic reassessment rather than permanent division.
From the American perspective, this evolving relationship presents both opportunities and complications. Washington views both Saudi Arabia and the UAE as cornerstone partners in ensuring energy security, countering terrorism, and maintaining regional balance. The United States encouraged Arab-Israeli normalization as part of a broader vision of regional integration, economic interdependence, and reduced conflict. The Abraham Accords, which also involved Bahrain and Morocco, demonstrated that incremental diplomacy could yield tangible results.
At the same time, U.S. policymakers are acutely aware that normalization without progress on Palestinian aspirations carries serious risks. Pushing Saudi Arabia toward formal recognition of Israel without addressing Palestinian grievances could undermine the legitimacy of moderate regimes and fuel regional instability. As a result, American strategy increasingly emphasizes balance, linking normalization to confidence-building measures such as easing restrictions in the West Bank, supporting Palestinian institutions, and discouraging settlement expansion.
A divided Gulf complicates this approach. It weakens coordinated pressure on Iran, disrupts collective security planning, and slows conflict resolution in places like Yemen. For Washington, the priority remains de-escalation, renewed diplomacy, and preventing Yemen from becoming a permanent source of regional instability that could spill over into global trade routes.
The economic implications of Saudi-UAE tensions are also significant. Gulf unity has long contributed to stable energy markets and secure shipping lanes through the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab. Even limited friction can increase insurance costs, unsettle investor confidence, and amplify volatility in oil prices. Asian economies are particularly sensitive to these risks, given their heavy reliance on Gulf energy supplies.
Pakistan watches these developments closely. Islamabad has deep political, economic, and cultural ties with both Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Millions of Pakistani workers live in the Gulf, and remittances form a crucial pillar of Pakistan’s economy. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have also provided financial support to Pakistan during periods of economic stress. Any prolonged tension between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi therefore places Pakistan in a delicate diplomatic position.
Pakistan’s likely approach is cautious neutrality combined with quiet diplomacy. Historically, Islamabad has emphasized Muslim unity and conflict mediation while avoiding entanglement in Gulf rivalries. Public alignment with one side would risk economic and political consequences. Background on Pakistan’s foreign policy positioning and regional relationships can be explored at https://www.aljazeera.com/where/pakistan/.
At the same time, Pakistan may gradually adapt to evolving regional realities. While formal recognition of Israel remains politically unfeasible without a just settlement for Palestinians, indirect engagement in areas such as agriculture, water management, and technology could become possible if broader normalization deepens. Regional connectivity initiatives, including projects linked to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, offer platforms where Gulf capital, Asian markets, and advanced technology could converge.
Across Asia, the ripple effects extend even further. Countries such as China, India, Japan, and South Korea rely heavily on Gulf energy and stable maritime routes. Uncertainty, even without open conflict, affects long-term investment decisions and strategic planning. India, in particular, maintains strong relationships with Israel, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Palestine. It has expanded defense and technological cooperation with Israel while continuing rhetorical support for Palestinian statehood, navigating these dynamics through careful balance.
Southeast Asian nations also favor inclusive dialogue and stability. Countries like Indonesia and Malaysia support Palestinian rights while avoiding polarization among Middle Eastern partners. There is growing interest in economic and interfaith models promoted by the UAE, alongside respect for traditional political positions. Regional organizations such as ASEAN could quietly support dialogue through Track II diplomacy, educational exchanges, and cooperation on development and climate resilience.
Yemen remains the most tragic casualty of this geopolitical contest. Years of war have devastated infrastructure, displaced millions, and pushed the country toward famine. The United Nations continues to describe Yemen as one of the world’s gravest humanitarian crises, documented at https://www.un.org/en/chronicle/article/yemen-worst-humanitarian-crisis. Any Gulf rivalry that prolongs instability risks deepening this suffering and delaying recovery for an entire generation.
Yet the crisis also presents an opening. The UAE’s military withdrawal reduces direct confrontation on the ground, while Saudi Arabia’s recent openness to negotiated settlements suggests space for diplomacy. A sustainable peace process must be Yemeni-led, inclusive, and supported rather than imposed by external actors. Power sharing, local autonomy, and economic reconstruction must advance together if peace is to hold.
A realistic peace initiative begins with Gulf reconciliation. Saudi Arabia and the UAE can rebuild trust through structured dialogue, confidence-building measures, and coordinated economic planning. Neutral mediators such as Oman or Kuwait, which have maintained balanced relationships across the region, could facilitate this process discreetly and effectively.
The international community also has a role. The United States, European Union, and Asian partners can link reconstruction aid to peace benchmarks, invest in education and healthcare, and support accountable governance structures. Economic integration, rather than military dominance, offers the most durable path forward. Initiatives that connect ports, railways, and digital infrastructure across the region could transform economic incentives away from conflict.
Looking ahead, the Saudi-UAE relationship is more likely to evolve than collapse. Shared interests in energy security, trade, and regional influence still outweigh differences. Competition will persist, but pragmatism is likely to reassert itself over time. The key question is not whether reconciliation will occur, but how long tension persists before cooperation becomes the more attractive option.
The broader lesson is that alliances are not static. They require constant alignment of interests and honest communication. When cooperation gives way to competition, dialogue becomes essential. Peace in the Middle East rarely arrives through dramatic gestures. It emerges slowly, through restraint, negotiation, and acceptance of imperfect solutions.
If Saudi Arabia and the UAE choose coordination over rivalry, Yemen can move toward recovery, the Gulf can regain cohesion, and Asia, including Pakistan, can benefit from a more stable and predictable regional order. That outcome depends on political will and a shared recognition that peace is not weakness, but strategy.
For further context and continuing analysis, readers can explore internal coverage at https://www.worldatnet.com/middle-east-analysis and https://www.worldatnet.com/geopolitics/asia-gulf-relations, alongside global reporting from https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/ and https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east.
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